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[29] 
The Second Amendment and the Struggle 
Over Cryptography 
by ERIC RICE* 
Abstract: The United States government and an alliance of Silicon Valley 
and civil libertarians have been engaged in a struggle over the control of 
cryptography since the beginning of t he information age.  T he debate has 
involved various constitutional arguments but has ignored the Second 
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms.  This article argues that in a digital 
world cryptography qualifies as a w eapon, as t he U.S. government has 
(correctly) asserted for decades, and so deserves c onsideration for Second 
Amendment protection. 
In that analysis, we see t hat cryptography serves al l of the Se cond 
Amendment values well.  It  enables revolution, the defense of minorities, the 
protection of the sanctity of the home, and the private individual’s contribution 
to the collective defense of the republic.  Indeed, it is already the most commonly 
used weapon in America for self-defense of property and family. 
The Second Amendment should be construed to protect cryptography and 
limit the government’s authority to regulate it. 
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I. Introduction 
 Cryptography, “the art or practice of writing in code or cipher”1 to keep 
secrets secret, has existed for millennia.2  While cryptography is, in one sense 
just a field of mathe matics, it can be implemented in systems for securing 
information, generally, today, in computer programs.3  However, for most of 
history, cryptography’s use was restricted almost entirely to governments.4  
That changed abruptly with the advent of public key cryptography in 1976, 
 
 1.  Cryptography, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2016). 
 2.  Jeffrey L. V agle, Furtive Encryption: Power Trust and the Constitutional Cost of 
Collective Surveillance, 90 IND. L.J. 101, 106 (2015). 
3. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA & GOLIATH 144 (W.W. NORTON COMPANY) (2015). 
 4.  See KENNETH DAM & HERBERT LIN, EDS. CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN SECURING THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY, Nat’l Research Council, xiii (1996); Vagle, supra note 2, at 199 n.94.  Of 
course, private citizens did occasionally use cryptography to protect their secrets.  See, e.g., Vagle, 
supra note 2, at 107 (noting use of cryptography by, inter alia, “priests . . . merchants . . . criminals, 
prisoners, and lovers”). 
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and the subsequent explosion of the internet, especially online banking and 
commerce.5 “Since the mid-1990s c ivilian and commercial use of 
cryptographic technology has been  wide-spread.”6  T he loss of this 
technological monopoly provoked a series of conflicts between the 
government and the private sector over who should have access to strong 
cryptography and under what conditions.  These con flicts are known as the 
“Crypto Wars.” 
Both sides in the Crypto Wars have marshaled various arguments —
policy, legal, and constitutional — a bout whether cryptography should be 
regulated.  Examining the full range of these arguments is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  My goal here is simply to introduce another consideration: the 
Second Amendment should lim it the go vernment’s ability to regulate 
cryptography. 
The Second Amend ment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State,  the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  In District of Columbia v. Heller, the 
Supreme Court held that the Amendment enshrines an individua l right to 
possess arms for self-defense.7 
In the digital age, self-defense is simply not possible without strong 
cryptography.  Our bank accounts would be open to whatever criminals come 
along and o ur every communication would be ex posed to go vernment or 
criminal eavesdropping.  Examples of the threats we f ace are all around us, 
from electronic bank heists to the Office of Personn el Management losing 
the personally identifiable information of many U.S. government officials — 
including those living undercover in hostile environments — to dom estic 
violence survivors being electronically surveilled by their attackers.  It is in 
this context that the National Inte lligence Council has called cryptography  
the “best defense” of personal information from criminals or governments.8  
And so, in th e modern world, if the Second Amendment does not protect 
cryptography, it no longer protects us. 
The text of the Second Amend ment does not intu itively encompass 
cryptography.  But the word “Arms” is sufficiently ambiguous that it could, 
and as th e world has dev eloped, we should read it to.  Indeed, the U.S. 
government itself has long and explicitly treated cryptography as a weapon, 
 
 5.  See Vagle, supra note 2, at 110–115. 
 6.  Id. at 115. 
 7.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787 (2008). 
 8.  James Ball, Secret US Cybersecurity Report: Encryption Vital to Protect Private Data, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/-sp-secret-us-
cybersecurity-report-encryption-protect-data-cameron-paris-attacks (last accessed Jan. 1, 2016). 
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which itself should justify consideration of Second Amendment protection for 
it. 
The first part of this paper gives a brief history  of the conflict over 
cryptography in American politics.  The second part puts forward the case 
for considering cryptography an “arm” protected by the Second Amendment.  
The final section outlines  some considerations relevant to applying Second 
Amendment doctrine to limit government regulation of cryptography. 
II.  The Crypto Wars 
“The fundamental question” at stake in the Crypto Wars “is whether or 
not governments should legislate against cryptography.”9  On one side, the  
unusual alliance of big business and civil libertarians say s no, arguing that 
widespread access to strong encryptio n is key for inform ation security, 
keeping the governm ent in check, and the success of the American 
technology industry.10  On the other side, the law enfo rcement and national 
security establishment say yes, arguing that widespread use of powerful 
cryptography would hamstring government efforts to fight  crime, prevent 
terrorism, and defend the homeland.11 
A.  Crypto Wars v. 1.0 
The first iteration of  the Crypto Wars was fought primarily on two 
fronts.12  One i nvolved export restrictions on cr yptography under the U.S. 
International Traffic in Arms Regula tions (“ITAR”).  The other involved a  
federal government plan for the te lecommunications industry to adopt 
encryption systems that allowed for government access to messages. 
1.  ITAR 
Coming out of the Second World War, the United States held a position of 
world economic dominance that made export controls a plausible tool of foreign 
policy, and the nascent Cold War seem ed a good reason to use them.13  The 
 
 9.  SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT TO 
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 303 (1999). 
 10.  See, e.g., id. at 303–09; Daniel Moore & Thomas Rid, Cryptopolitik and the Darknet, 58 
SURVIVAL 7, 8 (2016). 
 11.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 303–09. 
 12.  For an exhaustive and thoughtful treatment of the first iteration of the Crypto Wars , see 
A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the Constitution, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995). 
 13.  22 U.S.C. § 2778(a )(1) (2012); Whitfield Diffie & Su san Landau, The Export of 
Cryptography in the 20th Century and the 21st, available at http://privacyink.org/pdf/export_cont 
rol.pdf (last a ccessed, Jan. 1 8, 2016), 4 (also published in THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK, 725 (Karl de Leeuw & Jan Bergstra, eds. 2007)). 
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Arms Export Control Act gives the President authority — delegated to the State 
Department — to regulate the export of military technology.14  The State  
Department promulgated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations15 
pursuant to this authority.16  And that regime governs defense specific items, 
which are listed on the “Munitions List.”17  Items with both commercial and 
military application — “ dual use” items — are regulated by the Secretary of 
Commerce, pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).18  
Unsurprisingly, the res trictions on the export of “munitions” are fa r stricter, 
requiring individually approved export licenses.19 
In the post-WWII era, the Munitions List included “[c]ryptographic 
(including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, 
integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining 
secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems.”20  And this 
was perfectly reasonable, as cryptography was an almost exclusively military 
tool.21  However, cryptography remained on the munitions list even as civilian 
and commercial use of, and need for, cryptography grew with the information 
revolution in the late twentieth century.22 
American software companies, in order to send programs including 
cryptography abroad, needed either an individual licen se or to request a 
transfer of j urisdiction to the Commerce Department for their specific 
product.23  The licensing process took weeks or months and required the party 
seeking the license to be able to individually identify the end u ser.24  This 
placed an enormous burden on American companies,25 and licenses were often 
denied.26 
As the American computer industry began to face more serious 
competition from Europe and Asia, the economic consequences of banning 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30. 
 16.  See Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [Bernstein I]. 
 17.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE, 120–23 (2007); 15 C.F.R. §§ 768–99; 50 App. 
U.S.C. §§ 2401–20. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 727. 
 20.  22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1996); see Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1429.  The regulations did 
exempt certain cryptographic app lications such as the cryptography used in autom atic teller 
machines and some consumer software.  Id. 
 21.  Diffie & Landau, supra note 13, at 4. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 4, 6. 
 25.  Id. at 6. 
 26.  Id. 
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the export of cryptography became clea r: consumers bought from foreign 
companies that could provide more secure products.27  Gradually, political 
pressure mounted for a change in export policy in order to preserve American 
competitiveness globally.28  The first major step towards change c ame in 
1992, when a deal between the Natio nal Security Agency (“NSA”), the 
Department of Commerce, and RSA Data Security allowed for  expedited 
approval of two RSA cryptographic algorithms with relatively short (40 bit) 
key lengths.29  Key length is a common measurement of the security  of an 
encryption system (that uses a proven algorithm), as increasing key length 
dramatically increases the amount of work an attacker must do — and thus 
time an attacker must spend — to break the encryption.30 
At the same time, parallel opposition to the ITAR regime began to form, 
grounded not in concerns about economic competitiveness, but i n a 
libertarian political philosophy.  Phil Zimmerman was a programmer and 
anti-nuclear activist.31  As Cold War tensions eased, and the risk of nuclear 
holocaust faded, Zimmerman turned his attention from advocating against 
nuclear war to advocating for privacy. 32  He beli eved that the rise of 
electronic communication was causin g a paradigm  shift in governm ent 
surveillance by lowering the cost and effort required, because “emai l 
messages are just too easy to intercep t and scan for interesting key words.  
This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectabl y on a 
grand scale.”33  (And time, of course, has proven him right).  Cryptography, 
Zimmerman thought, was the tool that could prevent this “Orwellian” turn.34  
Zimmerman wrote: “[I]n the Information Age, cryptography is about political 
power, and, in particular, about the power relationship between a government 
and its people.  It is about the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom 
 
 27.  See id. at 8. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  Id. at 9. 
 30.  Id.; SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 144 (2015) (“[A] small change in key length results in an 
enormous amount of extra work for the attacker.  A 64-bit key might take an attacker a day to break.  
A 65-bit key would take the attacker twice the amount of time to break, or two days.  And a 128-bit key 
— which is at most twice the work to use for encryption — would take the same attacker 264 times 
longer, or one million billion years to break.  (For comparison, Earth is 4.5 billion years old).”). 
 31.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 295; see also Vagle, supra note 2, at 113; Diffie & Landau supra 
note 13, at 9; ANDY GREENBERG, THIS MACHINE KILLS SECRETS: HOW WIKILEAKERS, 
HACKTIVISTS, AND CYPHERPUNKS AIM TO FREE THE WORLD’S INFORMATION, 54 (2012). 
 32.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 296. 
 33.  Id. at 296. 
 34.  Id. 
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of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”35 
In order to preserve these fundamental political liberties, Zimmerman 
thought “ordinary people and grassroots political organizations” should have 
access to “affordable ‘m ilitary grade’ public-key cryptographic 
technology.”36  To this end, he developed Pretty Good Privacy, or “PGP,” an 
email encryption program.37  PGP used RSA technology, but keys that were 
far longer than 40 bits.38 
In 1991, the U.S. Senate omnibus anticrime bill was put forward.39  That 
law included a provisi on that woul d have requir ed those pr oducing 
cryptographic equipment to inclu de “back doors” that wo uld give the 
government a way to bypass the encryption.40  Although that provision never 
became law, Zimmerman feared it would and took a revolutionary step; he 
published PGP on the Internet, for free.41 
PGP was so on downloaded abroad, likely putting Zimmerman in 
violation of ITAR.42  The U.S. Attorney  for the Northern District of  
California convened a grand jury that spent over a year investigating him, 
before dropping the case.43  The U.S. Attorney apparently backed off because 
of massive public support for Zimmer man, who recalled that “[e ]very last 
article was sympathetic to [him].”44 
Another possible explanation lies in so mething that happened sho rtly 
before the investigation was dropped: MIT Press published the PGP source 
code in book format and applied for export permission.45  When the State 
Department simply ignored the request, MIT went ahead, published the book, 
and exported it.46  This stunt played on MIT’s institutional prestige to highlight 
the First Amendment implications of limiting the export of computer code. 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  VAGLE, supra note 2, at 114 (quoting PHILLIP ZIMMERMAN, THE OFFICIAL PGP USER’S 
GUIDE, 5–7 (1995); see also SINGH, supra note 9, at 296. 
 37.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 296. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id.; VAGLE, supra note 2, at 113; GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 74. 
 40.  Vagle, supra note 2, at 113; SINGH, supra note 9, at 295–96; GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 74. 
 41.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 301; see also Vagle, supra note 2, at 113; Diffie & Landau, supra 
note 13, at 9. 
 42.  VAGLE, supra note 2, at 113; Diffie & Landau, supra note 13, at 9. 
 43.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 9. 
 44.  Quoted in GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 86. 
 45.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 9; GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 87. 
 46.  GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 86. 
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Then, in 19 96, a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics named Daniel 
Bernstein, who had developed a new cry ptographic protocol, sued the 
Department of State, in the Northern District of California.  Bernstein sought 
a declaratory judgm ent stating that including cryptography in t he ITAR 
regime was unconstitutional under t he First Amendment and an injunction 
prohibiting the government from enforcing the reg ulations against him.47  
The District Court agreed, holding that the lice nsing scheme was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech.48 
In December of 1996, jus t before the District Cour t’s decision, and 
responding to political pressure fro m civil libertarians and the tech sector,  
President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 13026, which “transferred  
jurisdiction over the export of non military encryption products to the 
Department of Commerce.”49  By the end of th e month, th e Commerce 
Department had enacted an interim rule regulating the export of encryption 
under the EAR.50  Bernstein amended his complaint to challenge the EAR 
rule.51  The district court struck down the EAR rule too.52  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.53  But that opinion was withdrawn pending an en banc rehearing.54 
Then the go vernment retreated.  In 199 8, the Clinto n administration 
relaxed export restrictions on products containing Data Encryption Standard 
(“DES”) technology55 or using keys of 56 bits or less. 56  Meanwhile, some 
members of Congress began to push for the so-called Security and Freedom 
through Encryption (“SAFE”) bills, which would have reformed the export 
regulation scheme.57  Several such bills had failed when, in 1999, one  
 
 47.  Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1426. 
 48.  Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (N. D. Cal. 1996) [Bernstein II[ 
The Government won a similar suit brought by a programmer named Phil Karn , after the State 
Department denied him permission to  export a floppy disk containing the so urce code for 
implementing DES.  Karn v. U.S. Dept. of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 49.  Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1288 (N. D. Cal. 1997)  [Bernstein 
III]; 15 C.F.R Pt. 730 et seq. 
 50.  Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 1288. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 176 F.3d 1132, 1147 (9th Cir. 1 999) [Bernstein IV] 
withdrawn pending en banc reh’g, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 54.  Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).  The subsequent changes 
to the regime and Dep’t of Commerce opinions caused Bernstein to lose standing before the 
rehearing occurred. Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. C 95-0582, 2004 WL 838163, *1 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 55.  DES was the National Bureau of Standards’ favored cryptographic algorithm, developed 
in 1977.  Vagle, supra note 2, at 110. 
 56.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 12. 
 57.  Id. 
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survived its committee hearings and was on the cusp of deba te in the 
Senate.58  At this point, (likely because Vice-President Al Gore saw Silicon 
Valley as an im portant constituency for his upcom ing presidential 
campaign), the executive branch m ade a major concession and agreed that  
key length would no longer be a factor in determining whether cryptographic 
technology could be exported.59 
The old export system was replaced with a regime that strives to make 
a meaningful distinction between civilian or “retail” cry ptography and 
cryptography specialized for military use.60  “Retail” cryptography products 
must be submitted for a one-ti me review and if t he company does not hear 
anything within 30 days, it is free to sell it.61  Open source software is entirely 
exempted.62  While some military specific cryptographic technologies remain 
on the munitions list,63 this was a “virtually complete capitulation.”64 
2.  The Clipper Chip 
The second front of t he original Crypto Wars became “an epic battle  
that would preoccupy a generation of cryptographers.”65  This second fron t 
grew out of the ITAR fight when the administration promised relaxed export 
control for companies that agreed to  put backdoors into their technology.66  
In 1993, the Clinton administration attempted to replace the then national 
standard cryptographic algorithm, 50-bit DES, with a so called “key escrow” 
system, a new 80-bit alg orithm that provided the government with a 
“backdoor,” a technical means to access data with out first obta ining the 
password: the Escrowed Encryption Sy stem.67  This was “the infa mous 
Clipper system.”68 
 
 58.  Id. at 14. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 14–15. 
 62.  Id. at 15–16. 
 63.  See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XII (b)(1). 
 64.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 16. 
 65.  Matt Blaze, Key Escrow from a Safe Distance: Looking Back at the Clipper Chip, in 
ACSAC’ 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH ANNUAL COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS 
CONFERENCE, at 317. 
 66.  Id. at 1; DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 10 and n.9. 
 67.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 10 and n.9; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce & Nat’l Inst. 
Standards & Tec h., Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185, 
Escrowed Encryption Standard,  27 Fed. Reg. 59 (Feb. 9, 1994). 
 68.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 13, at 10 an d n.9.  Clipper was inte nded for telephonic 
communication; “Capstone” was a similar system intended for computer communication.  Singh, 
supra note 9, at 310; Diffie & Landau, supra note 17, 239–40. 
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At the time, most encryption technology was hardware based — the 
cryptographic algorithms were physically built into computer chips rather  
than implemented by software code — and the Clipper chip was meant to be 
easily substituted for t he chips in exis ting secure telephone har dware.69  
Clipper used a new algorithm, named “Skipjack,” developed by the NSA and 
highly classified, but presumably strong.70 
However, Clipper, of course, had a backdoor.  Clipper operated by first 
transmitting a so-called “Law Enforcement Access Field” (“LEAF”) at the 
beginning of every message.71  The LEAF contained the session key that was 
used to encrypt the m essage, and was itself encry pted with a diffe rent key 
that the government had access to. 72  Thus, in order to read a message, the 
government simply had to use its key to decrypt the LEAF, and then use the 
session key contained therein to decrypt the message.73 
Policy makers thought this an ideal solution that balanced the public’s 
demand for secure communication with the government’s desire for access 
to those communications.74  They never succeeded, however, in selling the  
skeptical public and tech industr y on it. 75  There were several reasons for 
this.  First, because Skipjack was classified, it was never subject to the sort 
of public stress-testing vital to ensuring the security of a cipher. 76  Second, 
Clipper was introduced at a time when hardware encryption was being 
rapidly replaced by cheaper software  encryption.77  Third, when export 
restrictions were lifted, th e government lost its  most important source of 
leverage for incentivizing its adopti on.78  Fourth, there were serious  
problems with the way  the back door functioned: when Matt Blaze, a 
researcher at AT&T Bell Labs, published a paper outlining way s in which 
the LEAF system could be circumvented, his findings were published on the 
 
 69.  See BLAZE, supra note 65, at 319. 
 70.  Id. at 317. 
 71.  Id. at 318. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, 52 (2006). 
 76.  Cryptographers are in near universal agreement that only systems which depend  solely 
on keeping the encryption key  secret are trustworthy.  See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED 
CRYPTOGRAPHY (2d ed.), 7 (1996); see also Bruce Schneier, Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity, 
CRYPTOGRAM, May 15, 2002, available at https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2002 
/0515.html (last accessed June 1, 2015). 
 77.  BLAZE, supra note 65, at 321. 
 78.  Id. 
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front page of The New York Times, above the fold.79  Fifth, the key escrow 
feature created security problems that potentially endangered the secrecy of 
the underlying message.80  Finally, many worried that adoption of Clipper 
would hurt American products in overseas markets.81 
Over the course of the next decade, the government tried unsuccessfully 
to push the adoption of various forms of similar systems.82  These failed for 
the same reasons.  Like ITAR, the Clipper chip and its progeny were simply 
politically unfeasible.83  Key escrow becam e an issue that stoked strong 
reactions from, and an unlikely alliance between, the far left and the far right: 
the ACLU and Rush Limbaugh criticized the plan with equal vigor.84  
According to on e CNN poll, 80 percent of Am ericans opposed the Clipper 
plan.85  In the face of this united front, the government backed off. 
B.  Crypto Wars v. 2.0 
After the overhaul of the export regim e and the defeat of Clipper, the  
civil-libertarian-Silicon Valley alliance believed it had won the  Crypto 
Wars.86  But i n 2014, major technology companies made the decision to 
bring encryption to the masses as never before, and the war was back on. 
1.  Apple and Google Fire on Fort Meade 
In the fall of  2014, Apple and Googl e increased the cryptogra phic 
protections they offered t o smartphone users.  Appl e was suffering from  
negative publicity due to the theft of  nude photos from celebrities’ Apple 
 
 79.  Id. at 318–320; GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 86. Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in 
Escrowed Encryption Standard, available at http://www.crypto.com/papers/eesproto.pdf (last 
accessed Aug. 4, 2016).  The flaws Blaze discovered did not in fact allow the attacker to access the 
plain-text of a message but rather allowed for a user to bypass the  LEAF mechanism altogether.  
Matt Greene, A History of Backdoors, A FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING, July 
20, 2015, available at http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/07/a-history-of-backd 
oors.html (last accessed, Jan. 18, 2016). 
 80.  Id. at 321. 
 81.  Steven Levy, The Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 12, 1994, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html (last accessed  
Apr. 18, 2015). 
 82.  BLAZE, supra note 65, at 321. 
 83.  LEVY, supra note 81, at 1. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  GREENBERG, supra note 31, at 86. 
 86.  Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Crypto Wars: Governments Working to Undermine 
Encryption, available at https://www.eff.org/document/crypto-wars-governments-working-under 
mine-encryption (last accessed Apr. 19, 2015); We now know that behind the scenes, the NSA was 
still working to weaken the cryptographic protocols advanced by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology to be the standard protocols across the internet. SHANE HARRIS, @WAR THE RISE 
OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX 88–93 (HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT) (2014). 
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accounts, and both companies were catering to consumer attitudes towards 
privacy that were assu med to have shifted dramatically following the 
Snowden revelations about the scope of NSA surveillance.87 
First, Apple announced th at the new iPhone operati ng system would 
automatically encrypt the contents of iPhones in such a way that the company 
could not access them.88  Thus Apple could not provide information on iPhones 
to law enforcement, even pursuant to a warrant.89  Prior to this change, Apple 
had a policy of unlocking phones pursuant to valid court orders.90 
Google immediately followed suit.  Althoug h Google had apparently 
never kept the encryption keys for Android phones,91 it began encrypting the 
phones running the Android operating system by default, rather than forcing 
users to actively choose to encrypt them.92 
2.  The Empire Strikes Back 
While privacy advocates lauded th ese decisions, law enforce ment 
officials rushed to condemn them.  FBI Director James Comey was one of 
the earliest and most vehement critics.  Comey claimed that he feared a time 
when an investigation would hinge on accessing the contents of a s mart 
phone and “people with tears in their ey es [would] look at [ him] and say, 
‘What do you mean you can’t?’”93  Not to be outdone in the rhetoric 
department, Chicago’s chief of detectives proclaimed: “Apple will become 
 
 87.  See, e.g., Craig Timberg, Newest Androids will join iPhones in offering default 
encryption, blocking police, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2014, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-
encryption-blocking-police/ (last accessed Apr.15, 2015). 
 88.  Craig Timberg, Apple Will no Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even With 
Search Warrants WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2014, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html 
(last accessed Apr.14, 2015). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id.  It is worth noting here that it is not clear whether Apple actually retained keys that 
allowed it to access the encrypted information on the phone or if so much of the information was 
unencrypted that it did not matter.  See Matthew Green, Why can’t Apple decrypt your iPhone, A 
FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING, Oct. 4, 20 14, available at http://blog. 
cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-iphone.html (last accessed 
Apr. 22, 2015). 
 91.  Ron Amadeo, Android L will have device encryption by default, ARSTECHNICA, available 
at http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/09/android-l-will-have-device-encryption-on-by-default/ 
(last accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
 92.  TIMBERG, supra note 87. 
 93.  Ken Dilanian, FBI chief: Apple, Google phone encryption perilous, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 25, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/420160593748455390db7aeaf0abafdc/ 
fbi-chief-new-phone-encryption-could-cost-lives (last accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
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the phone of  choice for the pedophile . . . . The average pedophi le at this 
point is probably thinking, ‘I’ve got to get an Apple phone.’”94 
In remarks at the Brookings Institu te, Director Comey articulated his 
concern over “going dark,” a pheno menon he described thusly: “Those 
charged with protecting our people aren’t always able to access the evidence 
we need to prosecute crime and prevent terrorism even with lawful authority.  
We have the  legal authority  to intercept and acce ss communications and 
information pursuant to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to 
do so.”95  Comey cautioned that “encryption threatens to lead all of us to a very 
dark place,” depicting a world in w hich kidnappers and terrorists could 
successfully hide behind the encryption on their phones.96 
Comey also anticipated the argu ment that even when phones are 
encrypted, the government has sufficien t tools to i nvestigate crimes.  He 
explained that metadata (such as tele phone records) — which is generally  
unaffected by encryption — does not provide a communications content and 
that brute-force attacks on passwords are difficult even with super-
computers.97  Acknowledging that t he information from devices that are 
backed up to “cloud” storage is generally encr ypted with keys a company, 
rather than an individual holds, he argued that criminals are unlikely to back-
up their devices.  Lastly, Comey argued that it is unlikely law enforcement 
could compel defendants to decrypt their phones (presumably meaning 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment) and that in any e vent, contempt 
punishments are inadequate to e ffectively compel compliance with c ourt 
orders.98 
Other government officials expressed sim ilar concerns, including 
Attorney General Holder, 99 NSA Dire ctor Admiral Rogers,100 UK Prime 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  James Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course, Oct. 16, 2014, available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology 
-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course (last accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Craig Timberg, Holder urges tech companies to leave device backdoors open for police, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 
2014/09/30/holder-urges-tech-companies-to-leave-device-backdoors-open-for-police/ (last accessed 
Apr.15, 2015). 
 100.  John Reed, Transcript: NSA Director Mike Rogers v. Yahoo! on Encryption Back Doors, 
JUST SECURITY, Feb. 23, 2015, available at http://justsecurity.org/20304/transcript-nsa-director-
mike-rogers-vs-yahoo-encryption-doors/ (last accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
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Minister Cameron,101 and President Ob ama.102  The l aw enforcement 
establishment was again pushing for stri ct regulations on cryptography and 
it seemed that a full reprise of the cry pto wars was u nderway.  In general, 
these policy makers advocated for  requiring companies to include 
“backdoors,” like the Clipper Chip.103 
3.  An Uneasy Truce 
Over the course of about a year a debate over backdoors raged between 
law enforcement on one side and the tech industr y and civil libertarians on 
the other.  However, in the post-Snowden world, it seemed that those in favor 
of strong encryption were winning the day in the court of public opinion.104  
In the fall of 2015, a leaked National Security  Council white paper showed 
that the ad ministration had apparently  decided not to seek legisl ation or 
otherwise compel backdoors in cry ptography.105  The war had apparentl y 
ended as suddenly as it had started. 
As one law enforcement official stated: “People are still not persuaded 
this is a problem.  People think we have not made the case.  We do not have 
the perfect example where you have the dead child or a terrorist act to point 
to, and that ’s what people seem to claim y ou have to have.”106  But that  
statement itself contains the seeds of another war: If they got such a case, the 
debate would be entirely different.  As another official wrote, “the legislative 
environment is very hostile today . . . [but] it could turn in the event of a 
terrorist attack or crim inal event where strong encryption can be shown to 
have hindered law enforcement.”107 
 
 101.  Nicholas Watt, e t al., David Cameron pledges anti-terror law for internet after Paris 
attacks, THE GUARDIAN, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/12/david-
cameron-pledges-anti-terror-law-internet-paris-attacks-nick-clegg (last accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
 102.  Julian Hattem, Obama backs calls for tech backdoors, THE HILL, Jan. 16, 2015, available 
at http://thehill.com/policy/technology/229787-obama-backs-call-for-tech-backdoors (last 
accessed Apr. 15, 2015). 
 103. TIMBERG, supra note 99; Comey, supra note 95; Reed, supra note 100; Watt, et al. supra 
note 101. 
 104.  Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Obama faces growing momentum to support 
widespread encryption, WASH. POST, Sept. 16 , 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpo 
st.com/world/national-security/tech-trade-agencies-push-to-disavow-law-requiring-decryption-of-
phones/2015/09/16/1fca5f72-5adf-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html (last accesse d Nov. 18, 
2015). 
 105.  Read the NSC Draft Options Paper on Strategic Approaches to Encryption, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-the-nsc-draft-options-paper-on-strate 
gic-approaches-to-encryption/1742/ (last accessed Nov. 18, 2015). 
 106.  Nakashima & Peterson, supra note 104. 
 107.  Id. 
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Within days of the November 2015 terrorist attack on Paris, the debate 
was rekindled, as reports surfaced that  the attackers had used e ncrypted 
communications to coordinate their attacks.108  And it only intensified after 
the attacks in San Bernadino, California. 109  In  January of 2016, state 
legislators in New York and California introduced bil ls that would ban the 
retail sale of smartphones with full disk encryption.110  In February of 2016, 
Apple and the Depart ment of Justi ce began a court battle over whether a 
court could force Apple t o create a new operating system to load onto the 
security of the San Bernadino gunman’s iPhone in order to disable some of 
the security features.  And in April of 2016 the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence introduced the “Compliance 
with Court Orders Act of 2016.”111  That Bill would have required companies 
that received a court order compelling it turn over certain data to “provide 
such information or data . . . in an intelligible format” or “provide such  
technical assistance as is necessary to obtain such information or data in an 
intelligible format or to achieve the purpose of the court order.”112  While the 
bill would have left the engineering details of compliance to individual 
companies, it would have effectively mandated backdoored systems.  That bill 
met with vitriolic opposition, and was dead in the water by May of 2016.113 
In short, this conflict is unlikely to end definitively anytime soon.  And it 
is in that context that this paper seeks to add another wrinkle to the discussion. 
 
 108.  See e.g., David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Encrypted Messaging Apps Face New 
Scrutiny Over Possible Role in Paris Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2015, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/encrypted-messaging-apps-face-new-scrutiny-over-possib 
le-role-in-paris-attacks.html?_r=0  (last accessed Nov. 18, 2015). 
 109.  See e.g., Feds, Silicon Valley headed for ‘collision’ over encryption issue, post San 
Bernardino, wave of terror attacks, FOX NEWS, Dec. 13, 2015, available at http://www. 
foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/13/feds-silicon-valley-headed-for-collision-over-encryption-issue-
post-san-bernardino-wave-terror-attacks.html (last accessed Jan. 18, 2016). 
 110.  Andy Greenberg, Proposed State Bans on Phone Encryption Make No Sense, WIRED, 
Jan. 27, 2016, available at http://www.wired.com/2016/01/proposed-state-bans-on-phone-encry 
ption-make-zero-sense/ (last accessed Jan. 28, 2016). 
 111.  Intelligence Committee Leaders Release Discussion Draft of Encryption Bill (Apr. 13, 
2016), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/4/intelligence-committee-leaders-
release-discussion-draft-of-encryption-legislation (last accessed May 31, 2016). 
 112.  Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016 (discussion draft), 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2016), 
available at http://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf (last accessed May 31, 2016). 
 113.  Dustin Volz, et al., Push for Encryption Law Falters Despite Apple Case Spotlight, 
REUTERS, May 27, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-encryption-legislation-idUSKCN 
0YI0EM (last accessed May 31, 2016). 
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III.  Priming the Second Amendment 
The Second Am endment states: “A well regulated Militia, be ing 
necessary to the security of a free State,  the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”114  The text is divided into two parts: the 
prefatory clause (“A . . . free State,”) and the operative clause (“the right . . . 
infringed”).115 
For most of American history, the Second Amendment was a backwater 
of political and constituti onal thought.116  It wa s the subject of only  the 
occasional decision and little scholarship.  The Amendment did enjoy some 
time in the li melight as a centerpiece of Charles Sumner’s speech, “The 
Crime Against Kansas,”117 and d uring reconstruction.118 Similarly, in the 
1960s, Black nationalists, includin g Malcom X and  the Black Panthers, 
breathed some life into the Second Amendment.119 
Nonetheless, by the 1980s, “the Second Am endment languished i n 
relative obscurity” and had been called “obsolete, defunct, and an unused  
provision, with no meaning for the twentieth century,” let alone the twenty-
first.120  But then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the National Rifle Association and 
the modern gun righ ts movement dusted off the Second Am endment and 
shoved it into the middle of a modern debate.121  That political shift coincided 
with a flood of Second Amendment scholarship.122  While much of this was 
funded by the NRA,123 respected liberal scholars — including Akhil Amar124 
 
 114.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 115.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 116.  See Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898, 898 (2004) 
(book review). 
 117.  The Crime Against Kansas, May 19–20, 1856, in AMERICAN SPEECHES: POLITICAL 
ORATORY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 553, 606–607 (T. Widmer ed. 2006); see 
also Heller, 554 U.S. at 609.  
 118.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770–77 (2010); ADAM WINKLER, 
GUNFIGHT 142 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2013); Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case 
Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 899 (2001). 
 119.  Jill Lepore, Battleground America, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/04/23/battleground-america; ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT, 
230–47 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2013). 
 120.  BANNER, supra note 116, at 898 (quoting Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins 
of the Second Amendment, 69. J. AM. HIST. 599, 599 (1982) (internal quotations omitted)); Lepore, 
supra note 119 (“In the two centuries following the adoption of the  Bill of Rights,  in 1791, no 
amendment received less attention than the Second, except the Third.”). 
 121.  See BANNER, supra note 116, at 901; Lepore, supra note 119. 
 122.  See BANNER, supra note 116, at 901; Lepore, supra note 119; MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY, 97–98 (2014). 
 123.  WALDMAN, supra note 122, 97–98; Jill Lepore, supra note 119. 
 124.  Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1999. 
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and Sanford Levinson125 — pitched in as well.126  Thus, by the beginning of 
the new millennium, the Second Am endment had “beco me part of the 
mainstream discourse about the Constitution.”127 
In this period, debate about the Amendment focused on the significance 
of the prefatory clause and whether the Amendment protected an individual 
right or a collective right. 128  One school of thought, generally  associated 
with the poli tical right, w as that the prefatory clause only  announced a  
purpose and the Amendment applied to ordinary citizens and the arms they 
own for self-defense, hunting, etc. 129  The opposite view, ge nerally 
associated with the political left, was that the prefatory clause constrained 
the right, and the Am endment only restricted the federal govern ment’s 
ability to interfere with State militias.130  Most of the federal circuits took a 
middle ground approach — the so called “sophisticated collective right” or  
“quasi-collective right” model — ruling  that t he right belonged to 
individuals, but only individuals connected to some sort of state militia and 
only protected weapons suitable for use in such a  militia.131  Alth ough 
formally a compromise, this approach skewed towards a statist view.132  Then, 
in 2001, the Fifth Circuit bucked the trend and became the first United States 
Court of App eals to endorse the individual rights view of the Second 
Amendment, with its opinion in United States v. Emerson.133  In 2007, the D.C. 
Circuit followed suit.134 
 
 125.  Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
 126.  WALDMAN, supra note 122, 99. 
 127.  BANNER, supra note 116, at 899. 
 128.  Id. at 902–03. 
 129.  Id. at 903. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. (citing Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710–11 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1274 & n.18 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 
273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v . 
Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th 
Cir. 1977); Cases v. United States, 131 F .2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 194 2)); see also United States v.  
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: 
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 252 (2008) (“Between 1942 and 2001 lower courts 
had been virtually unanimous  in rejecting the view that the  Second Amendment creates an 
individual right to use guns for no nmilitary purposes”); Steven G. Bradbury, et al., Whether the 
Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 28 OP. O.L.C. 126, 127 (2004). 
 132.  Emerson, 270 F.3d at 219. 
 133.  Id.  For a clear, exhaustive and compelling account of the arg ument for the individual 
rights view, see Bradbury, supra note 131. 
 134.  See Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380, (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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In 2008, the Supreme Court weigh ed in, with  its enorm ously 
controversial135 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.136  Heller struck 
down the Di strict of Colum bia’s strict gun control  laws, and settled the 
personal versus collective right debate by hol ding that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear ar ms for th e 
purpose of self-defense in the hom e.137  However, the Court was careful to 
indicate that there are limits on this right, clarifying that “certain longstanding” 
gun regulations are constitutionally permissible138 and that the right extends 
only to “‘ arms in common use at the time’ for lawful purpo ses like self-
defense.”139  Notably, however, Heller declined to articulate a standard of 
review to be used in Second Amendment cases, reasoning that the D.C. law at 
issue was so draconian — because it “bann[ed] from the home the most 
preferred firearm in th e nation to keep  and use for p rotection of one’s home 
and family” — as to be unconstitutional under any standard.140  Two years 
later, the Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment against state 
and local governments.141 
Heller and McDonald set off an ex plosion of Second Amendment 
litigation.142  T hus, the l ower courts have scram bled to put  together “the 
doctrinal plumbing” necessary to address these cases.143  That scramble has 
produced a widely accepted two-st ep process for analy zing Second 
Amendment claims.144  A court first determines “whether the challenged law 
 
 135.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 
95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and 
Gun Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32. 
 136.  Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 137.  Id. at 592. 
 138.  Id. at 626–27. 
 139.  Id. at 624 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 140.  Id. at 628–29 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141.  561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); see also id. at 858 (Thomas, J., concurring in part an d 
concurring in the judgment) (relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than the Due 
Process Clause). 
 142.  See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1180 (9th Cir. 2014) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 143.  Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After McDonald: Exploring the 
Contradiction in the Second Amendment, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011) (colloquy debate with 
Joyce Lee Malcolm). 
 144.  See Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To evaluate post-Heller 
Second Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit, co nsistent with the majority of our sister circuits, 
employs a two-prong test.”); see also, Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1251–58 
(D.C. Cir. 2011)[Heller II]; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d. 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–
704 (7th Cir. 2 011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–05 (10th Cir. 20 10); but see 
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burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”145  If it does not, the 
inquiry is at an end.  If it does, the court next decides upon and applies “an 
appropriate level of scrutiny.”146 
We turn now to discuss the obvious threshold question regarding how 
regulations on cryptography should be treated at the first step. 
IV.  Is Cryptography an Arm? 
In order for the Second Amendment to apply, cryptography must be an 
“arm.”  That it may  be seems counterintuitive.  But this is only because of 
how dramatically recent technological  developments have changed the 
character of security and the sorts of tools we need  to defend ourselves.   
Upon examination of the purposes of t he Second Amend ment in light of  
those modern developments, it becomes clear that cryptograp hy should be 
considered an arm. 
A.  The Text and Heller 
Of course, the first question we must ask is whether this interpretation 
is consistent with the text of the Constitution.  That is, can the word “Arms” 
plausibly be read to encompass cryptography? 
Because most Second A mendment litigation has been focused on 
firearms, federal courts have had re markably little occasion to address the 
question of what is an “arm.”147  Heller explained that the meaning of “Arms” 
today is n o different from the 18th century meaning.148  One 18th century 
dictionary, quoted in Heller, defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armor 
of defense;”149 another as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes 
into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.”150 
Paying attention to t he term “weapon” is helpful  for determ ining 
whether cryptography can be considere d an “arm.”  Heller uses the terms 
 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e think it better to ask 
whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have 
some reasonable relationship to th e preservation or efficiency of a well regulated milit ia, and 
whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self -defense.”) (internal quotation marks  
and citations omitted)). 
 145.  United States v Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 146.  See id. This can be framed as a three-step test, see Friedman, 784 F.3d at 415 (Manion, 
J., dissenting), but whether the test is broken into two or three steps is largely irrelevant. 
 147.  Two key state court cases to address the question are City of Seattle v. Evans, 366 P.3d 
906, and State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014). 
 148.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 
 149.  Id. (quoting 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 106 (Samuel Johnson, ed.) (4th 
ed.) (reprinted 1978)). 
 150.  Id. (quoting 1 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (Timothy Cunningham, ed. 1771). 
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“arm” and “weapon” interchangeably through much of the opinion and states 
that “the most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is 
to ‘have weapons.’”151  Heller cites Justice Ginsberg’s opinion in Muscarello 
v. United States152 for the proposition that to “bear arms” means to carry a 
“weapon” “for the purpose of . . . being armed and ready for  offensive and 
defensive action in case of conflict with another person.”153  We might infer 
from this that a weapon, o r arm, is something that one carries “in  case of 
conflict with another person.”154  Similarly, Webster’s defines “weapon” as: 
“An instrument of offensive or defensive combat” or “a means of contending 
against another.”155  Ultimately, “arms” or “weapons” include a wide range 
of instruments that are used — offensiv ely or defensively — in conflict or 
combat with another person. 
This understanding has guided the state suprem e courts that have 
addressed questions of what is an “ar m.”  The Connecticut Supreme Court, 
in deciding t hat dirk knives are “arms” for the pur poses of the Second 
Amendment, focused largely on the distinction between utilitarian tools and 
tools designed for combat.156  The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the 
history of knives in general, and dirks in particular, beginning with the knives 
of the Roman legionnaires, through the dirks of the Scottish highlands, to the 
Ka-Bar fighting knives issued to Marin es in Vietnam.157  The Washingt on 
Supreme Court engaged in a sim ilar analysis in determ ining that paring 
knives are not arms.158  That Court held that paring knives are no dif ferent 
from any every day object “which might be effectively  wielded for 
protection or attack,” such as rolling pins, frying pans, and candlesticks.159  
Because the paring knife was not desi gned for conflict, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that it was not an “arm.”160 
Unlike paring knives, cryptography was designed for conflict.  Indeed, 
it is only useful in case of conflict with another person.  While guns may be 
 
 151.  Id. at 582. 
 152.  524 U.S. 125, 131 (1998). 
 153.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 131). 
 154.  Id. (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 131). 
 155.  WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY, 1307 (1988) (defining 
“weapon” as “[a]n offensive or defensive combat instrument” or “[a] means employed to overcome, 
persuade, or get t he better of anot her”); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 1369 
(1991) (defining “weapo n” as “[a] n instrument used  in offensive or defensive comb at” or “[a] 
means employed to disarm, persuade, or get the better of another”). 
 156.  DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 175. 
 157.  Id. at 192–193. 
 158.  See Evans, 366 P.3d 906, 906. 
 159.  See id. at 872. 
 160.  Id. 
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used to hunt, and axes to log — even dirks are useful for cutting food — 
cryptography is only useful when there are other people seeking to steal your 
secrets, impersonate you, or otherwise harm you.  Gary Wills wrote, “[o]ne 
does not bear arms against a rabbit.”161  Ditto cryptography. 
Cryptography’s centrality to conflict — and the centrality of conflict to 
cryptography — explains  why the use of cryptography was li mited to 
soldiers, spies, and diplomats for most of history.162  Indeed, if we think back 
to the ITAR debate during the first iteration of the Crypto Wars, the United 
States government itself considered cryptography an “arm” for much of the 
twentieth century.163  Cryptography lived on the “munitions list,” rather than 
the dual use  list, precisely because it was al most exclusively useful for 
military conflict until recently .164  And when we  consider the role 
cryptography played in the Second World War 165 and the rhetoric of the 
Crypto Wars, the idea that cryptography is an arm begins to seem plausible. 
However, there are two key  objections to overcome.  The first is t hat 
cryptography is not a physical object like a rifle.  And it is true that no case 
has extended the Second Amendment to protect intangible things.  Looking 
at those 18th century definitions, “takes into his hands” may imply physical 
instruments.  But “useth” is much broader, and nothing about the definitions 
of the terms “arm,” “weapon,” or “thing” inherently limits them to physical 
items — even if most are physical items — a s opposed to concepts or  
ideas.166  More importantly, in the digital age, “arms” can be no more limited 
to analog te chnology than can the “speech ” protected by  the First 
Amendment or “searche s,” that the Fo urth Amendment protects against.   
Today, the ter m “speech” includes video gam es,167 and virt ual child 
pornography.168  “Sear ches” include thermal i maging of a dwelling take n 
 
 161.  Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995 
 162.  See, e.g., DAM & LIN, supra note 4, at xiii; Vagle, supra note 2, at 199 n. 94. 
 163.  See Diffie & Landau, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  See, e.g., DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 17, at 6–7, MAX HASTINGS, THE SECRET WAR: 
SPIES, CIPHERS, AND GUERRILLAS 1939–1945, 83, 157, 394–95, 403, 407–08, 545, 548–49 (2016). 
 166.  See, e.g., Arms, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/10809?isAdvanced=false&result=3&rskey=LavZO4& (last accessed  Jan. 2 6, 2016); 
Arm, n.2, WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (1984); Weapon, n., OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/226597?rskey=I91pBR& 
result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last accessed July 19, 2016); Thing, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200786?rskey=Ah9QTB&result 
=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last accessed July 19, 2016). 
 167.  See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
 168.  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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from the street,169 and the attach ment of a GPS tracking device to a car.170  
Like those terms, “arms” must be read in light of the digital age we now live in, 
an age in which the United States military has an entire command devoted to 
electronic warfare,171 and electronic weapons have been used to destroy Iranian 
centrifuges,172 and “cyber” operations figure prominently in American plans for 
wars with world powers.173  Thus, despite cryptography being intangible this 
should pose no obstacle to it being considered an arm. 
Another possible objection is that the term “arms” most intuitively 
encompasses only offensive tools.  Ho wever, definitions that Heller relies 
on clearly indicate that defensive tools are just as much arms as offensive 
tools.  Those definitions explicitl y include “armor of defense”174 and “any 
thing that a man wears for his defence.”175  For this reason Eugene Volohk  
has suggested,176 and several district courts have assu med without 
deciding,177 that body armor is an “arm.”  Although one district court has 
held that body armor is not an “Arm,”178 that conclusion is in obvious tension 
with Heller’s language, which makes clear that the term “arms” is not limited 
to offensive tools.179 
Thus, as a purely textual matter, “arms” is at least an ambiguous term 
that can be interpreted to encompass cryptography.  We should therefore look 
to the Second Amendment’s history and purpose to resolve the ambiguity.180  
 
 169.  See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2011). 
 170.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 171.  See, e.g., Richard A. Clarke et al, Liberty & Security in a Changing World: Report and 
Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence & Communications Technology 
185–86 (Dec. 12, 2013). 
 172.  See, e.g., Joby Warrick, Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet 
Cyberattack, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/15/AR2011021506501.html (last accessed Aug. 3, 2016). 
 173.  See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear 
Dispute Led to Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
02/17/world/middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html (last 
accessed Aug. 3, 2016). 
 174.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 581  (quoting 1 DICTIONARY OF TH E ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 106 
(Samuel Johnson, ed.) (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978)) . 
 175.  Id. (quoting 1 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (Timothy Cunningham, ed., 1771)). 
 176.  See Eugene Volohk, Implementing The Right To Keep And Bear Arms For Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework And A Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1476 n. 133 (2009). 
 177.  See United States v. Serrano, 2016 WL 3702744, at *4 (S.D.N.Y., June 9, 2016); Bell v. 
United States, 2013 WL 5763219, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013); United States v. Smith, 2009 WL 
3241992, at *1 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 8, 2009). 
 178.  United States v. Davis, 906 F. Supp. 2d 545, 558 (S.D.W.V. 2012). 
 179.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 
 180.  See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014). 
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When we do so, the a nswer is c lear; every viable181 theory of th e Second 
Amendment counsels strongly in favor of considering cryptography an arm. 
B.  The Purposes of the Second Amendment 
Heller tells us that the prefatory  clause “does not limit or expand the 
scope of the operative clause” but states a purpose and thus may “resolve an 
ambiguity in the operative clause.” 182  So, the purpose of the Second 
Amendment can help us resolve the ambiguity in the question whether 
cryptography is an arm.  There are a number of (sometimes overlapping)183 
theories about the Second Am endment’s animating purp ose, and 
cryptography serves each of them extraordinarily well. 
1.  Self-Defense 
Heller recognizes self-defense as “the central component of the [Second 
Amendment] right itself.” 184  Thus, for many, the right to self-defense,  
grounded in the Lockean ideal that “eac h man’s home is his castle , and he 
has a natural right to defend himself, his family, and his pro perty against 
threats from the outside w orld,” animates the Second Amend ment.185  By 
this view, “the freedom of a state was understood at the time of the Founding 
to include a citizen’s individual right of self defense (that is, defense of his 
right to life and personal security) when the state cannot assist him.”186 
Notably, the Second Amendment, by virtue of the command, “shall not 
be infringed,” recognized a preexisting right.187  Many think that that original 
right was a natural law right of self-defense, considered foun dational to 
liberty.188  St. George Tucker, one of the most influential early commentators 
on the Constitution explained: “The right of self-defense is the first right of 
nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this 
right within the narrowest limits possible.  Whereve r standing armies ar e 
kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color 
 
 181.  This paper deals only with theories of the Sec ond Amendment that are broa dly 
reconcilable with Heller.  Cf. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155–56. 
 182.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–78.  For a thorough and clear explanation of why the prefatory 
clause does not limit the right, see Bradbury, et al., supra note144, at 145–49. 
 183.  Cf., AMAR, supra note 118, at 898 (“Even with regard to the Founding, it’s simplistic to 
deny any link between collective security and individual self-defense.”). 
 184.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. 
 185.  Williams, The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 586 (1991). 
 186.  BRADBURY, ET AL., supra note 131, at 159. 
 187.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 188.  BRADBURY, ET AL., supra note 131, at 187. 
CRYPTO - FINAL_TOMLASTLOOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  2:43 PM 
52 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the 
brink of destruction.”189 
For those who share this view, cryptography should certainly be viewed 
as an arm and one protected by the Second Amendment, because it is vitally 
important for self-defense in the modern day.  As Bruce Schneier has put it: 
“In a world where cyberattacks are becoming more common and more 
catastrophic, encryption is one of our most important defenses.”190  Even the 
FBI has recommended encrypting smartphones to protect onesel f.191  
Currently, several U.S. Governm ent agencies, including the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,192 OnGuard Online, 193 and the Co mputer 
Emergency Response Team ,194 as well as foreign governm ents,195 
recommend using encr yption to protect yourself. Indeed, the P resident’s 
Review Group on Intelligence and Comm unications Technology 
recommended that the U.S. government promote the use of cryptography for 
this reason.196 
Cryptography “is the most important privacy-preserving technology we 
have, and one that is uniquely suited to protect against bulk-surveillance — 
 
 189.  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, 300 n. D (1803; reprint 1996); 
see BRADBURY, ET AL., supra note 131, at 159. 
 190.  Quoted in Rob Price, Bruce Schneier: David Cameron’s Proposed Encryption Ban Would 
‘Destroy the Internet’, BUSINESS INSIDER, July 6, 2015 , available at http://www.business 
insider.com/bruce-schneier-david-cameron-proposed-encryption-ban-destroy-the-internet-2015-7 
#ixzz3fE7sDTh0 (last accessed July 7, 2015). 
 191.  Trevor Timm, The FBI Used to Recommend Encryption. Now They Want to Ban It., THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015 
/mar/28/the-fbi-used-to-recommend-encryption-now-they-want-to-ban-it (last accessed July 13, 
2015); Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Smartphone Users Should be Aware of Malware Targeting 
Mobile Devices and the Safety Measures to Help Avoid Compromise, Oct. 22, 2012, available at 
https://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-releases/2012/smartphone-users-should-be-aware-of-malware 
-targeting-mobile-devices-and-the-safety-measures-to-help-avoid-compromise (last accessed July 
13, 2015). 
 192.  How to Protect Yourself Online, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/katrina/protect 
yourselfonline.htm (last accessed July 13, 2015). 
 193.  Computer Security, OnGuard Online, http://www.onguardonline.gov/articles/0009-
computer-security (last accessed July 13, 2015).  OnGuardOnline.gov is managed by the Federal 
Trade Commission in partnership with about 15 other agencies.  See About Us, OnGuard Online, 
available at http://www.onguardonline.gov/about-us (last accessed July 13, 2015). 
 194.  U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Safeguarding Your Data, available at 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST06-008 (last accessed July 13, 2015). 
 195.  See e.g., Australian Government, Protecting Yourself Online: What Everyone Needs to 
Know, https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/CyberSecurity/Documents/PDF%20-%20Pr 
otecting%20Yourself%20Online%20-%20Second%20Edition%20-%20Booklet.pdf (last accessed July 
13, 2015). 
 196.  CLARKE, ET AL., supra note 171, at 217. 
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the kind do ne by . . . criminals looking for vu lnerable victims.”197  
“Encryption protects our data . . . .  It protects our conversations, whether 
video, voice, or text.  It protects our privacy.  It protects our anonymity.  And 
sometimes, it protects our lives.”198 
Because cryptography is  so vital to self-defense, the Second 
Amendment should protect it.  A particular version of the self-defense theory 
strengthens the case even further. 
a.  The Frontier 
During oral argument in Heller, Justice Kennedy suggested that the 
Second Amendment had “to do with the concern of the rem ote settler to 
defend himself and his family  against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, 
wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that.”199  In Justice Kennedy’s 
view, “[t]he Second Amendment wasn’t designed for the minutemen of the 
colonies to fight a tyrannical government; it was designed for the people of 
the frontier t o fight t he tyranny of outlaws.”200  On Justice K ennedy’s 
frontier, “the only law that mattered was ‘the law a man carried on his hip’” 
and, by his view, the Seco nd Amendment’s role was to make sure that law 
wasn’t stripped away.201 
It is on the frontier, “when the sanctions of society and laws are found 
insufficient to restrain the  violence of oppression,” that the ri ght of self-
defense is most applicable.202  For, “the law, which was made for my 
preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, 
which if lost, is capable of  no reparation, permits me my own defense.”203  
So, perhaps we should not be surprised that the Founders decided to 
constitutionalize the right to defend oneself. 204  Professional polic e 
departments were still decades away,205 and “the importance of th[e] right of 
 
 197.  Bruce Schneier, Why We Encrypt, Foreword to Privacy Int’l et al., Securing Safe Spaces 
Online: Encryption, online anonymity and human rights, available at https://www.privacy 
international.org/sites/default/files/Securing%20Safe%20Spaces%20Online_0.pdf (last accessed  
July 13, 2015) at 3. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Transcript of Oral Argument, at 8, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 200.  WINKLER, supra note 118, at 157. 
 201.  Id. (quoting James Truslow Adams, Our Lawless Heritage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 
1928, at 732). 
 202.  1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *144 (quoted in Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, 
at 145–49). 
 203.  John Locke, Second Treatise on Government §§ 18–19, at 12–13 (Richard H. Cox ed., 
1982) (1689) (quoted in Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 145–49). 
 204.  LEVINSON, supra note 125, at 646. 
 205.  Id.; see also DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 17, at 127–28. 
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self-defense was reinforced by  the absence of any  constitutional duty of 
government to defend citizens’ lives, liberty, or property.”206 
Yet, when we think about the Second Am endment in that light , it 
appears incongruous in m odern America.  As Justice Scalia put it: 
“Undoubtedly some think that the Second Am endment is outmoded in a 
society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, [and] where well-
trained police forces provide personal security .”207  Justice Brey er 
emphasizes this point in his Heller dissent, arguing that the “development of 
modern urban police departm ents, by diminishing the need to kee p loaded 
guns nearby in case of intruders, would have moved any such right [to keep 
handguns at home] even further away  from the heart of t he amendment’s 
more basic protective ends.”208 
In modern America there are no frontiersmen, and the government has 
largely, if not entirel y, taken over the role of  protecting citizens from 
physical threats.  But the government is woefully inadequate when it comes to 
protecting us from online threats.  Indeed, we see time and time again that the 
government can hardly protect itself.209  And often it is private entities that 
discover and combat major campaigns of electronic crime and espionage.210 
As President Obama put it: “The cyberworld is the Wild Wild West — 
to some degree [the government is] asked to be the sheriff.” 211  In othe r 
words, one must be prepared to defend oneself online: In the physical world, 
the need for self-defens e is the exception; in c yberspace, it’s the rule.  As  
General Hayden, the former director of the CIA and the NSA, put it: “In the 
way we have not had to do in physical space since the closing of the frontier 
 
 206.  BRADBURY, ET AL., supra note 131, at 145–49 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Soc. 
Servs. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1989)). 
 207.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 208.  Id. at 715 (J. Breyer, dissenting). 
 209.  See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & N icole Perlroth, U.S. v. Hackers: Still Lopsided Despite 
Years of Warnings and a Recent Push, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2015, available at 
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/us/us-vs-hackers-still-lopsided-despite-years-of-warnings-
and-a-recent-push.html?referrer=&_r=2 (last accessed July 20, 2015); see also, Nicole Perlroth, 
Code Specialists Oppose U.S. and British Government Access to Encrypted Communication, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7 , 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/technology/code-special 
ists-oppose-us-and-british-government-access-to-encrypted-communication.html?smid=tw-nytim 
es&_r=0 (last accessed July 7, 2015) (“[G]overnment agency breaches [are] now the norm — most 
recently at the United States Office of Personnel Management, the State Department and the White 
House . . . .”). 
 210.  Ben WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND GERMS, 
HACKERS AND DRONES: CONFRONTING NEW THREATS 68–70 (2015). 
 211.  Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Obama Calls for New Cooperation to Wrangle the 
‘Wild West’ Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/ 
business/obama-urges-tech-companies-to-cooperate-on-internet-security.html?_r=0 (last accessed 
July 6, 2015). 
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in the nineteenth century, we’re goi ng to have to defend o urselves in 
cyberspace.”212 
This reality is evidenced by the ways in which private co mpanies are 
preparing to defend themselves.  For example, as of 2015, JPMorgan Chase 
had 1000 computer-security personnel, led by two retired U.S. Air Force 
colonels, with a quarter-billion dollar budget. 213  The bank also built  a new 
computer-security facility near NSA headquarters in Mar yland, to make it 
easier to lure more military talent.214  Other financial firm s have similarly 
inflated information-security budgets.215  Sim ultaneously, venture capital 
investment in cybersecurity companies has skyrocketed.216  Companies are 
racing (and paying) to defend themse lves, because they know that the y 
cannot rely on the government. 
On this new frontier, large firms hire private armies of security experts, 
but ordinary civilians are left to sel f-defense.  Here, where the government 
is struggling to perform its securit y function, we should consider 
cryptography an arm  protected by  the Second Amendment.  A fter all, “it 
simply has to be the case that in a world of diminished government protection, 
the individual has greater latitude to take matters into his or her own hands.”217  
To do so we need to be armed, which means we need cryptography. 
2.  The Insurrectionist Theory 
Heller also e mbraced the “insurrectionist theory” of the Second 
Amendment.218  Under this t heory, grounded in both Lockean liberal and 
 
 212.  General Michael Hayden, The Cybersecurity Podcast, Encryption Wars and Privacy Shield, 
Feb. 23, 2016, available at http://passcode.csmonitor.com/podcast (last accessed Mar. 4, 2014). 
 213.  Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, JPMorgan Goes to War: The bank is Building a New 
Facility Near the NSA’s Headquarters to Attract New Talent; BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, FEB. 
19, 2015, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/jpmorgan-hires- 
cyberwarriors-to-repel-data-thieves-foreign-powers (last accessed July 7, 2015). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Daniel Huang, Emily Glazer, & Danny Yadron, Financial Firms Bolster Cyber Security 
Budgets: Survey Finds Companies Plan to Increase Spending by $2 Billion Over Next 2 Years, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17 , 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/financial-firms-bolster-
cybersecurity-budgets-1416182536 (last accessed Ju ly 7, 2015) (noting that Citigroup,  Inc. and 
Wells Fargo & Co. have information security  budgets of approximately $300 million and $250 
million respectively). 
 216.  See Max Taves, How Fear and Self-Preservation are Driving a Cyber Arms Race: Silicon 
Valley is Pouring More Money into Internet Security Companies than Ever Before, CNET, May 2, 
2015, available at http://www.cnet.com/news/how-fear-and-self-preservation-are-driving-a-cyber-
arms-race/ (last accessed July  7, 2015) (reporting that venture funding for security firms in 2014 
totaled $2.39 billion, representing a 35% increase over the prior year). 
 217.  WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 231. 
 218.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; see also Lepore, supra note 119. 
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republican ideals219 the Second Am endment was intended to allow f or an 
armed citizenry — “the Militia” the Amendment speaks of was “comprised 
all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense”220 
— that would act as a prophy lactic against tyranny at all tim es, and fight 
against tyranny when necessary.221  At the time the Second Amendment was 
penned, “[i]t was understood across t he political s pectrum that the right 
helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to 
oppose an oppressive military force if the consti tutional order broke 
down.”222  In short, according to this theory, “the republican Framers of the 
Second Amendment insisted on the right of all private citizens to keep arms, 
so as to be able to revolt.”223 
The heart of  the theor y is that “the ultimate “checking value” i n a 
republican polity is the abilit y of an ar med populace, presu mptively 
motivated by a shared  commitment to the co mmon good, to resist 
government tyranny.”224  Common armament, James Madison argued, was 
an advantage Americans had over all other people.225  Justice Story viewed 
it “as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral 
check against the usurpa tion and arbitrary  power of rulers; and will 
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people 
to resist and triumph over them.”226 
This insurrectionist view makes in tuitive sense, given that the Second 
Amendment’s Framers “had some first hand experience with the benefits of 
the militia in resisting tyranny.”227  In James Madison’s opinion “[t]hose who 
are best acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against 
the British arms” would realize that no federal government turned tyrannical 
could hope to succeed in oppressing the Militia. 228  So, the theory  goes, “if 
Congress should ever use standing armies to advance ty rannical designs, 
they would be outnum bered and outfought by liberty-loving militia 
 
 219.  See Williams, supra note 202, at 584. 
 220.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 221.  See LEVINSON, supra note 125, at 657. 
 222.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 223.  WILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 584 (describing Levinson, supra note 125). 
 224.  LEVINSON, supra note 125, at 648; see also Brent J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second 
Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REV. 673, 674 (2000). 
 225.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 at 299 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 226.  3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890 (1883) (quoted in Levinson, supra note 125, at 649). 
 227.  WILLIAMS, supra note 185, at 581. 
 228.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 at 299 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); see Bradbury, 
et al., supra note 131, at 179. 
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members.”229  For that vision to co me to pass, especially today, the Militia 
would need cryptography. 
a.  Cryptography and Revolutions 
In the colonies, there would have been little use for cry ptography in 
day-to-day life.  “Revolutions, howeve r, provide fertile soil for intrigue, 
espionage, and, of course , secret communications.”230  And am ong those 
who appreciated the im portance of cr yptography in revolution were the 
Second Amendment’s Framers.231  Thr oughout the Revolutionary period, 
American political figures used various forms of cryptography  to protect 
both public and private correspondence.232 
 “America was born of a revolutionary conspiracy” and “the young nation’s 
leaders . . . turned to codes and ciphers in an effort to preserve the confidentiality 
of their communications.”233  Cryptography was a vital weapon of resistance for 
the American colonists and the Founding Fathers “viewed secret writing as an 
essential instrument for protecting critical information in wartime.”234  Even 
before the Revolution broke out, colonists used cryptography to evade the 
English censors.235  G overnment agents commonly opened and read mail, 
driving men like Thomas Jefferson to encipher their correspondence.236  
Benjamin Franklin even printed a textbook on the encryption techniques of the 
day.237  In N ovember of 177 5, the Continental Congress established the 
Committee of Secret C orrespondence — which included key figures like 
 
 229.  WILLIAMS, supra note 185, at 576. 
 230.  RALPH E. WEBER, MASKED DISPATCHES: CRYPTOGRAMS AND CRYPTOLOGY IN AM. 
HISTORY, 1775–1900 xii (1993); see also Ralph E. Weber, A Masked Dispatch, 14 CRYPTOLOGIA, 
374–80 (1990); Ralph E. Weber, James Lovell and Secret Ciphers During the American Revolution, 
2 CRYPTOLOGIA 75–88 (1978). 
 231.  See John A. Fraser, III, The Use of Encrypted, Coded and Secret Communications is an 
“Ancient Liberty” Protected by the United States Constitution, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 21 (1997); 
WEBER, MASKED DISPATCHES, supra note 252,  at xii; Jennifer Wil cox, Revolutionary Secrets: 
Cryptology in the American Revolution, https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/historic 
al-figures-publications/publications/pre-wwii/assets/files/Revolutionary_Secrets_2012.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 232.  FRASER, supra note 231, at 21–40. 
 233.  Id. at 21 (quoting David W. Gaddy, Introduction¸ in WEBER, MASKED DISPATCHES, 
supra note 230). 
 234.  WEBER, MASKED DISPATCHES, supra note 230. 
 235.  FRASER, supra note 231, at 20. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
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Franklin, and John Jay — and tasked it with engaging with rebel sympathizers 
oversees, intelligence missions, and the development of codes and ciphers.238 
As it was to the American Revolution, secrecy is key to most rebellions.  
Surprise attack and misdirection are the bread and butter of insurgent forces.  
“Guerrillas are masters of the arts of simulation and dissim ulation; they 
create pretenses and si multaneously disguise or conceal t heir true 
semblance.”239  And the ability to keep information from the enemy is among 
the guerrillas’ m ost important traits.240  As Chair man Mao wrote, “[t ]he 
movements of guerilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the 
enemy must be taken una ware, and the action entered speedily .”241  Che 
Guevara similarly emphasized surprise and secrecy.242  Guevara taught that 
the guerrilla soldier: 
 
ought to be close-mouthed. Everything that is said and done before 
him should be kept strictly in his own mind.  He ou ght never to 
permit himself a single useless word, even with his own comrades 
in arms, since the enemy will always try to introduce spies into the 
ranks of the guerrilla band in order to discover its plans, locations, 
and means of life.243 
 
Guevara tells us that in preparing fo r an insurgency “[a]bsolute secrecy, a 
total absence of inform ation in the enemy’s hands, should be the primary 
base of the m ovement.”244  It is only s ecrecy that allows insurgents to 
compete with the professional militaries of nation-states.245 
And because secrecy  is key , cryptography is key.  Paul Revere used 
code to signal the British mode of advance.  Lawrence of Arabia used British 
codes during the Arab Revolt. 246  Russian nihil ists developed their own 
 
 238.  Central Intelligence Agency, A Look Back . . . Intelligence and the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2011-featured-sto 
ry-archive/intelligence-and-the-committee-of-secret-correspondence.html (last vis ited Oct. 12 , 
2015); see also Fraser, supra note 231, at 20. 
 239.  Samuel B. Griffith, MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE, 26 (trans. with 
Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith), (2007). 
 240.  See id. at 23. 
 241.  See id. at 97. 
 242.  ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE 13–15, 26, 35–37, 52–53, 57, 60, 63, 
69, 109–13 (2012). 
 243.  Id. at 37. 
 244.  Id. at 110. 
 245.  See Dr. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-
Level Counterinsurgency, available at http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer 
06_kilcullen.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
 246.  DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 312 (1996). 
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encryption schemes,247 as did European a nti-monarchical societies.248  All 
sides in the Mexican Re volution employed cryptography.249  The Iris h 
Republican Army encrypted messages between its members.250 
Of course, in rebellion, secrecy is a matter of life or death, and so 
cryptography is too.  Mary, Queen of Scots was beheaded after her encrypted 
communications about a plot to assassinate Queen Elizabeth and install Mary 
on the th rone were deciph ered.251  Fren ch Huguenot insurgents relied on  
cryptography through the wars of religion, before eventually being forced to 
surrender Realmont after the Royal Army decrypted their messages.252  And 
many of those active in the Resistance during the Second World War lost their 
lives as a result of failing to use adequate cryptography.253 
Moreover, if cryptography was important to rebels in the past, it is even 
more so now.  Given the immense power of m odern surveillance, 
cryptography is one of the only ways to hope to ensure secrecy in the modern 
era.254  This is why the U.S. government has taught Iranian Mujahedeen-e-
Khalq fighters to use cryptography, along with small-unit tactics and  
weapons training.255  Similarly, the government has urged the use of Tor by 
the Syrian rebels battling Bashar al-Assad,256 and has trained them to encrypt 
their internet chats and their com puters.257  And  Edward Snowden uses 
cryptography in his attem pts to ev ade the Amer ican national security 
apparatus.258 
 
 247.  Id. at 620–21. 
 248.  Id. at 772–73. 
 249.  José De Jesús Angel Angel & Guillermo Morales-Luna, Cryptographic Methods During 
the Mexican Revolution, 33 CRYPTOLOGIA 188–96 (2009). 
 250.  Stephen Budiansky, Review of Decoding the IRA by Tom Mahon and James J. Gillogly, 
33 CRYPTOLOGIA 292–94 (2009). 
 251.  VAGLE, supra note 2, at 108 (citing SINGH, supra note 9, at 32–44). 
 252.  Id. at 107 n.33 (citing KAHN, supra note 246, at 157). 
 253.  See HASTINGS, supra note 165, at 264, 267–69, 273. 
 254.  See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption & Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 416, 470–473 (2012). 
 255.  Seymour M. Hersh, Our Men in Iran?, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/our-men-in-iran (last visited July 28, 2015). 
 256.  HARRIS, supra note 86, at 86. 
 257.  Jay Newton-Small, Hillary’s Little Startup: How the U.S. is Using Technology to Aid 
Syria’s Rebels (June 13 , 2012), available at http://world.time.com/2012/06/13/hillarys-little-
startup-how-the-u-s-is-using-technology-to-aid-syrias-rebels/ (last visited July 28, 2015). 
 258.  See, e.g., James Banford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, available at 
https://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/#ch-7 (last visited Aug. 3, 2016);  Micah Lee, 
available at https://theintercept.com/2014/10/28/smuggling-snowden-secrets/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2016). 
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b.  The Paradoxical Prefatory Clause 
Heller embraced both the insurrectionist and self-def ense theories of 
the Second Amendment.  The two are linked by the idea that when citizens 
rise up, the weapons the y have to fight with will be the ones they keep for 
self-defense.259  In many ways however those two purposes have diverged as 
military technology has developed.  It  is hard to im agine a citizen-militia, 
armed with weapons commonly  used for self-defense, defeating the U.S.  
military.260  As Heller states: 
 
It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias 
in the 18th centur y, would require sophisticated arms that are 
highly unusual in society at large.  Indeed, it may be true that no 
amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day 
bombers and tanks.  But the fact that modern developments have 
limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the  
protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.261 
 
This is the “symmetry problem” that  Brent McIntosh has explained. 262  
“Effectuating the pur pose of the Second Am endment presupposes so me 
rough proportionality between the arms available to Am ericans and t he 
weapons held b y those against whom  Americans are to  defend 
themselves.”263  And the problem arises because the arms used for war and 
self-defense have diverged since 1789.264 
Cryptography, however, is an exception to this trend.  It is equally well 
suited to self-defense against criminals and battling oppressive regimes.  The 
cryptography many citizens use every  day for self-defense is effe ctively as 
sophisticated as the cry ptography used by major governments and 
 
 259.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 260.  See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an 
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 315–17 (1991); see also The West Wing: Six 
Meetings Before Lunch, (NBC television broadcast Apr. 5, 2000) (President Bartlet: “Do you think 
I could take George Washington?”  Charlie: “Take him at what, sir?”  President Bartlet: “I don’t 
know. . . a war?” Charlie: “Could you have taken George Washington in a war?”  Bartlet: “Yeah.”  
Charlie: “Well, you’d have the Air Force and he’d have the Minutemen, right?”  President Bartlet: 
“The Minutemen were good.”  Charlie: “Still, I think you could probably take him.”); 
 261.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
 262.  MCINTOSH, supra note 224, at 692–93. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 697; Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
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militaries,265 and is useful against them .266  Indeed, if the cryptography that 
individuals are using was not effec tive against government agencies, we 
would not be having this discussion at all. 
3.  “ God created men.  Colonel Colt made them equal.” 267 
In an influe ntial 1991 article, Robert J. Cottrol and Ray mond T. 
Diamond have argued that the Second Amendment should be analyzed “with 
an eye toward subcultures in American society who have been less able to 
rely on state protection.”268  Justice Thomas emphasized this theory in his 
McDonald concurrence.269  And history supports them. 
In England, prior to the Revolution, the right to a rms was “highly 
circumscribed by the English class st ructure.”270  Indeed, the Ga me Act 
deprived most English subjects the right.271  This led Blackstone to complain 
that “fifty times the property  [was] required to enable a man to kill a 
partridge, as to vote for a  knight of the shire.”272  This was, of co urse, a 
method of social control of the masses, who “[t]he law often regarded . . . as 
a dangerous class, useful perhaps in defending shire and real m, but also 
capable of mischief with their weapons, mischief towards each other, toward 
their betters, and toward their betters’ game.”273 
Discriminatory limits on the English right to bear arms were also based 
on religious distinctions: Catholics were seen as potentially subversive and 
thus often denied the right.274  And it was the attem pt of King James II — 
England’s last Catholic monarch — to disar m Protestants that led to the 
incorporation into the English Bill of Rights of its seventh provision: “That 
the Subjects which are [P]rotestants may have [A]rms for their [D] efence 
suitable to their [C]onditions, and as allowed by [L]aw.”275 
 
 265.  See, e.g., Christopher Soghoian, Lawfare Podcast Episode #98 Chris Soghoian Responds 
to FBI Director Comey (Oct. 30, 2014), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/11/the-
lawfare-podcast-episode-98-chris-soghoian-responds-to-fbi-director-james-comey/ (last visited May 
29, 2015); Clarke, et al., supra note 171, at 186–87. 
 266.  See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 197, at xix. 
 267.  WINKLER, supra note 118 , at 161. (This was a Colt marketing slog an and a  common 
saying on the frontier. It also reflects the views of the 14th Amendment’s framers).  See id. at 142. 
 268.  COTTROL & DIAMOND, supra note 260, at 319. 
 269.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 844 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 270.  COTTROL & DIAMOND, supra note 260, at 321. 
 271.  Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 169. 
 272.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *175. 
 273.  COTTROL & DIAMOND, supra note 260, at 321; Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 205. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  BRADBURY, ET AL., supra note 131, at 168. 
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The English right thus  codified class and religious distinctions 
anathema to American ideals.  For this reason, early American commentators 
praised the Second Amendment as more egalitarian than, and thus superior to, 
its English counterpart.276  St. George Tucker exalted the Second Amendment 
for being a right of th e whole of the people “without any qualification as to  
their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.”277  The 
British version, he argued, kept “the mass of the people” “in a state of the most 
abject subjugation,” while “in America we may reasonably hope that the 
people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and bearing arms as the 
surest pledge of their liberty.”278 
In theory, the Second A mendment, unlike the British right, was a 
democratic one.  “Those who had been part of the suspect classes in England — 
the poor, religious dissenters, and others who had traditionally only enjoyed a 
qualified right to possess arms — found the right to be considerably more robust 
in America.”279  However, they had been replaced with a new racial underclass, 
whose “right to possess arm s was highly dependent on white opinion of black 
loyalty and reliability.”280  Restrictions on the extension of the right to keep and 
bear arms to Blacks varied by time and place, but were always animated by the 
omnipresent specter of slave rebellion.281 
“After the Civil War, S outhern anxiety about an uprising among the 
newly freed slaves peaked.  As Representative Thaddeus Stevens is reported 
to have said, ‘[w ]hen it was first proposed to free the  slaves, and arm the 
blacks, did not half the nation tremble?’”282  This set off “systematic efforts 
in the old Confederacy to disarm the more than 180,000 freedmen who had 
served in the Union Army, as well as other free blacks.”283  Southern States 
passed Black Codes, which dramatically limited the rights of freedmen to 
 
 276.  Id. (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 125–26 (2d ed. 1829; reprint 1970). 
 277.  2 Tucker’s Blackstone at *143–44 & nn. 40–41; Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 205. 
 278.  2 Tucker’s Blackstone at *414 n 3; Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 205. 
 279.  Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 260, at 326. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  See id. at 331–39; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 844 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to 
overstate the extent to which fear of a slave upris ing gripped slaveholders and dictated the acts of 
Southern legislatures.”); id. at 845 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The fear generated by these and other 
rebellions led Southern legislatures to take particularly vicious aim at the rights of free blacks and 
slaves to speak or to keep and bear arms for their defense.”). 
 282.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 844 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, 104 (1965)). 
 283.  Id. at 847 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 771) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
WINKLER, supra note 118, at 139. 
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keep and bear arms.284  “Additionally, throughout the South, armed parties, 
often consisting of ex-Confederate sol diers serving in the state militias, 
forcibly took firearms from newly freed slaves.”285 
This mass disarmament was of great co ncern to those fighting for  the 
civil rights of the newly  freed slaves. 286  “For them, the right of the black 
population to possess weapons was not merely of symbolic and theoretical 
importance; it was vital . . . [as] a means of preventing virtual reenslavement 
of those formerly held in bondage.”287  Indeed, it was a major impetus in the 
northern Republican push for applying the Bill o f Rights to the states.288  
Fredrick Douglas himself believed that abolition would not be complete until 
the Constitution protected the right of blacks to keep and bear arms.289 
The situation was clear: “When guns were outlawed, only Klansmen would 
have guns.”290  And “[t]he use of firearms for self-defense was often the only 
way black citizens could protect themselves from mob violence.”291  Thus, for 
some, the animating principle of the Second Amendment lies in protecting 
Blacks from racial violence and oppression in the Deep South.  For them “the 
poster boy of arms” is not “the Concord minuteman [but] the Carolina 
freedman.”292  This theory is a sort of hybrid of the self-defense and 
insurrectionist theories, by which the Second Amendment assures individuals 
the means to defend themselves from violence, whether public, private, or both.  
Such a reading was particularly necessary at the time, because the line between 
public and private violence was blurry in the reconstruction South, where 
“sometimes the sheriff wore a badge; sometimes he wore a sheet.”293 
The (putatively) democratic nature of the American right implies both 
that it enabled the people to protect themselve s against the usurpation of 
 
 284.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 847 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 
260, at 344–45; Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 223–24. 
 285.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 844 (Thomas, J., co ncurring) (quoting id. at 772) (intern al 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 286.  WINKLER, supra note 118, at 139. 
 287.  COTTROL & DIAMOND, supra note 260, at 345. 
 288.  Id. at 345–46; Bradbury, et al., Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 224–25. 
 289.  In What New Skin Will the Old Snake Come Forth? An Address Delivered in New York, 
New York, May 10, 1865, reprinted in 4  THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 79, 83–84  (J. 
Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds., 1991). 
 290.  AMAR, supra note 118, at 899. 
 291.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 857 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 292.  AHKIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 266 (1994). 
 293.  Darrel A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 945–
46 (2011); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 779 (Alito, J., majority), 847 (Thomas, J., concurring), 
855–56 (Thomas, J., concurring); Amar, supra note 118, at 899; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 
260, at 319, 348. 
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power by the few; and that it enabled the few to protect themselves against 
the violence of the m any.294  The Am erican Revolution dramatized the 
former role.  The civil rights struggle, from the antebellum period through 
the Sixties, dramatized the latter.  In the 1960s the Black Panthers seized on 
the Second Am endment as a tool in the struggle, bringi ng arms into 
California’s capitol and “patrolling” the police.295 
Particularly for those w hose view o f the Secon d Amendment is 
motivated by the image of the Carolina freed man, cryptography should be 
considered an arm.  Perhaps cryptography would have been of little more use 
to the Carolina freed man than the Mo ntana pioneer.  But it m ight be an 
especially useful tool of  self-defense minorities of thought: political 
dissidents; religious m inorities; and th ose who l ove people t hey’re not 
supposed to.296  As the U.N.’s special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and 
expression put it, cryptography can 
 
provide individuals with a means to protect th eir privacy, 
empowering them to browse, read, develop and share opinions and 
information without inter ference and enabling jo urnalists, civil 
society organizations, members of ethnic or religi ous groups, 
those persecuted because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity, activists, scholars, artists and others to exercise the rights 
to freedom of opinion and expression.297 
 
It can protect those reading heretical religious text s, studying subversive 
political tracts, or viewing niche pornography, regardless of whether the y 
face persecution from a state or private members of an intolerant society.298  
It can protect those same groups as they seek to discuss their unwelcome ideas 
with others, whether converting them, organizing them, or seducing them.299  
And for these people, privacy is also a matter of physical security. 
 
 294.  In his Abridgement of his three volume Commentaries, Justice Story listed the Second  
Amendment among those “properly”  included in the Bill of Rights (he would have excluded the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh, which relate to judicial procedure).  These “proper” rights served three  
purposes, one of which was the protection of minorities.  Bradbury, et al., supra note 131, at 208 
(citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 980–
982, at 695 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, eds., 1833, reprint 1987)). 
 295.  WINKLER, supra note 118, at 230–44. 
 296.  As will be discussed later, the Second Amendment right here be gins to blend with the 
First Amendment rights to expression and association. 
 297.  U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, A/HRC/29/32, (May 22, 
2015.), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx 
 298.  Id. at 5–6. 
 299.  See id. at 7–8. 
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It is because cryptography is so useful against repressive governments 
that the State Departm ent funds Tor, the anonymous web-browsing client, 
and other “counter-censorship and secure communications technolog y.”300  
Between 2008 and 2013, t he State Department spent over $100 million on 
programs that involved the distribution of cryptographic software, designed 
to allow activists and dissidents to “exercise their human rights freely and 
safely online.”301  Moreover “[d ]uring the Arab Spring [the State 
Department] train[ed] people to use tools like Tor to escape censorship and 
retaliation.”302  The program under which Washington trained Syrian rebels 
in encryption grew out of  an aborted plan to teach sim ilar techniques to 
religious dissidents in China.303 
As it is, dissidents, journalists, and others who must worry about what 
they say commonly  use Tor to ev ade China’s ubiquitous internet  
surveillance.304 Those wo rking for Tibetan independence rely on 
cryptography to keep their messages secret, and themselves safe.305  Iranian 
activists did the same during the 20 09 protests.306  Groups like Fr eedom 
House recommend that human rights activ ists use encryption in repressive 
countries.307  Many other, less prominent, dissident groups around the world 
use PGP, Skype, and other widely available cryptographic methods to evade 
government surveillance.308  Others are developing communications systems 
relying on c ryptography precisely for co mmunicating in the face o f 
 
 300.  Andrea Peterson, The NSA is Trying to Crack Tor. The State Department is Helping Pay 
For It., WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/ 
10/05/the-nsa-is-trying-to-crack-tor-the-state-department-is-helping-pay-for-it/; Dune Lawrence, 
The Inside Story of Tor, the Best Internet Anonymity Tool the Government Ever Built, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-23/tor-anonymity-
software-vs-dot-the-national-security-agency#p1. 
 301.  Clarke, et al., supra note 171, at 217. 
 302.  Id.; see also Newton-Small, supra note 257. 
 303.  NEWTON-SMALL, supra note 257. 
 304.  Dimitri Vitaliev, Vaulting the great firewall, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.5, 2008), http://www.the 
guardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/05/china.censorship; Lawrence, supra note 300. 
 305.  Vagle, Furtive Encryption, supra note 2, at 107  n. 34 (citing KAHN, supra note 268, at 
84); Tibet- the cyber wars (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/technology/2008/03/tibet 
_the_cyber_wars.html. 
 306.  LAWRENCE, supra note 300. 
 307.  Cynthia Romero, What Next? The Quest to Protect Journalists and Human Rights 
Defenders in a Digital World, FREEDOM HOUSE, 8 (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ 
files/What%27s%20Next%20%20The%20Quest%20to%20Protect%20Journalists%20and%20Hu
man%20Rights%20Defenders%20in%20a%20Digital%20World.pdf; Stephanie Hankey & Daniel 
O Clunaigh, Rethinking Risk and Security of Human Rights Defenders in a Digital Age, 5 J. HUM. 
RTS. PRAC. 535, 539 (2013). 
 308.  See Oliver Leistert, Resistance against Cyber-Surveillance within Social Movements and 
how Surveillance Adapts, 9 SURVEILLANCE & SOCIETY, 441, 446–47 (2012). 
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tyranny.309  And, com ing full circle, there has been a  recent effort in the  
United States to increase fam iliarity with cryptography  in the Black  
community.310 
In keeping with this theme, encryp tion can be particularly useful for 
women to protect themselves from gender-based violence.  It is an important 
tool for domestic violence surv ivors seeking to escape from  their 
tormentors.311  And it can be used to help women defend t hemselves from 
online sexual violation.  Women are m ost frequently the victims of non-
consensual pornography — the dissemination of sexually expli cit images 
without consent.312  And nonconsensual pornography  has especially severe 
consequences for women. 313  It can se verely damage victims’ career 
prospects; lead to anxiety ; depression and anorexia; and harass ment, both 
online and offline.314  It can also be used to extort victims, either for money 
or for additional explicit materials.315  Cryptography may not protect women 
when the perpetrator of nonconsensual pornography is an  ex, or someone 
else who obtained the images with the victim’s consent.316  However, in some 
circumstances — including the publication of celebrities’ nude photos that 
kicked off round two of the cryptowars — the photos may be published by a 
hacker who stole intimate photos stored on the victim’s phone or computer.317  
In those situations, women can use cryptography to defend themselves.318 
 
 309.  See Soulaf Saab, et al, Secure Cryptographic Mechanisms for Safeguarding Citizen 
Communications in the Presence of Tyranny, 2 INT’L J. INFO. SEC. RESEARCH (2012). 
 310.  Adrianne Defries, The Black Community Needs Encryption, MOTHERBOARD (DEC. 11, 
2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-black-community-needs-encryption?utm_source=m 
btwitter. 
 311.  See LAWRENCE, supra note 300. 
 312.  See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346, 353 (2014). 
 313.  See id. 
 314.  Id. at 350–52. 
 315.  Benjamin Wittes, et al., Sextortion: Cybersecurity, teenagers, and remote sexual assault 
(May, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2016/05/sextortion/sext 
ortion1.pdf?la=en. 
 316.  See CITRON & FRANKS, supra note 312, at 346. 
 317.  See e.g., Wittes, et al., supra note 315, at 2, 10, 19–20; Andrea Peterson, Emily Yahr and 
Joby Warrick, Leaks of nude celebrity photos raise concerns about security of the cloud (Sept. 1, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/leaks-of-nude-celebrity-photos-raise-concerns-
about-security-of-the-cloud/2014/09/01/59dcd37e-3219-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_stor y.html; 
Benjamin Wittes & Mona Sedky, The Lawfare Podcast: Mona Sedky on Prosecuting Sextortion 
(June 25, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-mona-sedky-prosecuting-
sextortion (“Many of the sextortion cases involve hacking.”). 
 318.  See Keith Stuart, How to Protect Your Digital Photos from Hackers, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/03/how-to-protect-your-digit 
al-photos-from-hackers. 
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a.  Collective Defense in “the Era of DIY Signals Counterintelligence”319 
In part, t he Second Amendment envisioned that t he people w ould 
contribute to the collectiv e defense of the United States against foreign 
aggressors.320  In light of Cold War era m utually assured destruction, and 
post-Cold War American hegemony, that the Militia might be necessary to 
combat foreign aggressors see ms absurd.  And it may be, with regard to  
kinetic battles.  However, a citizenry  armed with cryptography is important 
for defending the homeland against foreign aggression, not in som e 
dystopian future, but today. 
The face of national security has changed drastically since the dawn of 
the internet era.  More and more combat takes place online and the distinction 
between military and civilian targets is constantly eroding.  For examples of 
this, one need only look to the state-sponsored data breaches at the Office of 
Personnel Management, American Airlines, Anthem Inc., and Sony Corp.  
Perhaps the best exa mple is large- scale intellectual theft from  American 
industry.321  “Foreign intelligence agencies have been penetrating American 
corporate networks and  stealing te chnology electronically since the 
1990s.”322  General Keith Alexander has called Chinese industrial espionage, 
“the greatest transfer of wealth in history .”323  These thefts fro m private 
companies obviously implicate national security in a national interest and 
economic sense.324 
However, these thefts also implicate national security in ways that 
matter to the warfighter on the ground, because many of our classifie d 
military secrets sit on the private networks of American industr y.325  A war 
with China could see A merican pilots flying F-35s against re markably 
similar planes and pilots that know the F-35’s weaknesses.326  That is because 
Chinese hackers stole huge am ounts of technical and design inf ormation 
about the F-35 — the most advanced, most expensive, fighter ever built — 
from the networks of Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors.327  The F-35 
is hardly the only example of this.  “Every branch of the US Armed Forces 
 
 319.  WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 69. 
 320.  See MCINTOSH, supra note 224, at 683. 
 321.  Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital 
Espionage, Crime, and Warfare, 45–53 (2011); DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 17, at 5. 
 322.  BRENNER, supra note 321, at 45. 
 323.  HARRIS, supra note 86, at 53. 
 324.  See id. at 53. 
 325.  BRENNER, supra note 321, at 63. 
 326.  See HARRIS, supra note 86, at xiv–xv. 
 327.  See id. at x–xv. 
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ha[s] been compromised, along with the technology and weapons that the 
United States use[s] to fight in every domain — land, air, sea, and space.”328 
Furthermore, the bulk of Americ an critical infrastructure is in private  
hands and vulnerable to electronic attack. 329  Policy makers tremble at the 
thought that an electronic attacker “could hijack th e Internet-connected 
devices that regulate the flow of electrical power and plunge our cities into 
darkness.”330  Foreign hackers have already  probed the infrastructure  
controlling our electrical grid, and in other countries electronic attacks have 
caused power-outages.331  The same could happen here. 332  Indeed, it  may 
have already happened; at least some officials believe foreign hackers were 
responsible for major blackouts in 20 03 and 20 08 (although t hey likely 
triggered the power outages accidently while exploring the system).333  The 
financial system — also supported by private networks — is similarly 
vulnerable; an adversary could cause “a national p anic” by “erasing or  
corrupting the data in fin ancial accounts.”334  Perhap s most frightening, 
nuclear facilities could be attacked as well.335 
Most American computer networks are private, and the govern ment 
cannot hope to secure them by itself.336  In light of this merging of public and 
private security, we need “an engaged and mobilized citizenry — a tru e 
bottom-up awareness and willingness to act  in the interests of security.” 337  
“Counterintelligence used to be the stuf f of government spies and nation-
states; it was the concern of the CIA, the FBI, and the military.  It is now a 
concern for every  organization that liv es on electro nic networks and has 
secrets to keep.”338  Ordinary people will have to be involved i n security, 
which often means simply keeping themselves secure.  That includes using 
 
 328.  See id. at 140. 
 329.  See WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 227; Michael Assante, America’s Critical 
Infrastructure Is Vulnerable To Cyber Attacks, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/realspin/2014/11/11/americas-critical-infrastructure-is-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks/. 
 330.  HARRIS, supra note 86, at xii. 
 331.  Id. at 155. 
 332.  See Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack, WIRED (Jan. 20, 
2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-plant-hack/. 
 333.  HARRIS, supra note 86, at 52–53. 
 334.  Id. at xx. 
 335.  NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, NTI NUCLEAR SECURITY INDEX: BUILDING A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND ACTION 4 (3rd ed. Jan. 2016). 
 336.  HARRIS, supra note 86, at xx. 
 337.  WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 226. 
 338.  BRENNER, supra note 321, at 64. 
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strong passwords and updating softwar e.339  It al so includes using strong 
cryptography. 
Writing from a national security standpoint, Joel Brenner recommends 
that companies encrypt all of their sensitive data in order to protect  
themselves and the cou ntry in a net worked world.340  Richard Clarke  
recommends encrypting the signals in and o ut of the power-grid’s control 
systems to protect critical infrastructure. 341  On a more micro level, using 
cryptography to safeguard the privacy  of individuals can hav e national 
security implications.  For example, both civilian and government networks 
are often penetrated thro ugh “spearphishing”: an unsuspecting employee 
clicks on a li nk in an ema il that appears to come from a trusted source.342  
The more attackers know about the target and the purported sender, the more 
carefully they can craft their attacks and the more likely they are to succeed.  
Private use of cry ptography can protect those personal details from being 
used by the would-be attackers. 
Indeed, a contributing factor to the end of the original crypto-wars may 
have been that “the nat ional-security establishment decided that the 
widespread use of strong encryption . . . was, in the end, ultimately in the 
nation’s interest.”343  That is the same conclusion that the President’s Review 
Group on Intelligence an d Communications Technologies came to in 
2013.344  That group issued “reco mmendations  . . . designed to protect our 
national security and adva nce our foreign policy while also respe cting our 
longstanding commitment to pri vacy and civil li berties . . .”345 Among its 
conclusions was that, “[t]he use of reliable encryption software to safeguard 
data is critical to m any sectors and organizations, including financial  
services, medicine and health car e, research and development, and other 
critical infrastructures in the United States . . .” and therefore  
 
the US Government should: (1) fully support and not undermine 
efforts to create encryption standards; (2) not in any way subvert, 
undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available 
commercial software; and (3) increase t he use of encryption and 
 
 339.  WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 227. 
 340.  BRENNER, supra note 321, at 241–42. 
 341.  RICHARD A. CLARKE, CYBERWAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 169 (2010).  See also, id. at 174. (recommending all informati on on all 
Department of Defense computers should be encrypted). 
 342.  See e.g., HARRIS, supra note 86, at xvi, 129, 155, 187. 
 343.  DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 17, at 9; see also DAM & LIN, supra note 4, at xiii; 
 344.  Clarke et al, supra note 171, at 216–19. 
 345.  Id. at 1–2. 
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urge US co mpanies to do so, in order t o better prot ect data in 
transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.346 
 
Similarly, General Michael Hayden, the former Director of both the CIA and 
the NSA, Ad miral Mike McConnell, the former director of the NSA and  
DNI, and Michael Chertoff, the former secretary of Homeland Security have 
all said that widespread, strong encr yption is important for t he national 
security of the United States.347 
b.  A Structural Point 
In a 2004 o pinion, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) laid out the 
argument for the “individual right” view under the Second Amendment that 
was eventually adopted in Heller.348  That opinion includes a structura l 
argument for the “individ ual right” vi ew that also  weighs in favor of 
considering cryptography an “arm” protected by the Second Amendment.  
OLC argued that the Second Amendment exists in “a subset of th e Bill of 
Rights amendments, the First through Fourth, that relates most directly to 
personal freedoms,”349 which allow Americans “to act without undu e 
governmental interference.”350  As the opinion points out, the Secon d 
Amendment is “useful for protecting not only the citizen’s person but also 
the ‘houses’ that the Third and Fourth Amendments guard.”351 
Similarly, if cryptography is considered an “arm,” the Second Amendment 
would be useful for protecting the privacy interest in what happens in our 
“houses” — which the Third and Fourth also protect — as well as the rights to 
anonymous speech and association — which the First Amendment protects.352  
As Phil Zimmerman wrote: “[I]n the Information Age, cryptography is about 
political power, and, i n particular, about the power relationship between a 
government and its people.  It is about th e right to priv acy, freedom of 
 
 346.  Id. at 216. 
 347.  Episode 11: Encryption Wars and Privacy Shield, THE CYBERSECURITY PODCAST (Feb. 
23, 2016), http://passcode.csmonitor.com/podcast. 
 348.  Bradbury et al., supra note 131, at 127. 
 349.  Id. at 161. 
 350.  Id. at 162; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (drawing on the First, 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Amen dments, and th eir “penumbra and emanations” in  finding a  
constitutionally protected right to privacy). 
 351.  BRADBURY ET AL., supra note 131, at 162. 
 352.  See e.g., LESSIG, supra note 75, at 67; Gwynne B. Barrett, The Law of Diminishing 
Privacy Rights: Encryption Escrow and the Dilution of Associational Freedoms in Cyberspace, 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 115 (1998); Jill M. R yan, Freedom to Speak Unintelligibly: The First 
Amendment Implications of Government-Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165 
(1996); see also U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 319. 
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expression, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”353 
This point is closely related both to the ability to fight tyranny and to 
the protection of m inorities.  Akhil A mar has written that “because ballots  
and the First Am endment have genera lly worked t o prevent ful l-blown 
federal tyranny, bullets and the Second Amendment need not bear as much 
weight today as som e pessimists anticipated two centuries ago.” 354  
However, the fact rem ains that “[ a]lthough the Constitution guarantees a 
high degree of political freedom and autonomy, ‘the Government has often 
undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political 
beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on 
behalf of a hostile foreign power.’” 355  Against such a threat, cryptography 
allows us to defend our privacy-adjacent rights.  This is made clear by the 
number of constitutional argu ments one can make against regulating 
encryption.356  Interpreting “arms” to include cryptography would thus sync 
the first four amendments into a positive feedback loop of privacy protection.  
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recognized as much when it stu ck down export 
restrictions on cryptography in Bernstein IV.357  That Court concluded that:  
 
[g]overnment efforts to control encryption . . . may well implicate 
not only the First Amendment rights of cry ptographers . . . but 
also the constitutional rights of each of us as potential recipients 
of encryption’s bounty. . . . the government’s efforts to retard 
progress in cryptography may implicate the Fourth Amendment, 
as well as the right to speak anonym ously, the right against 
compelled speech, and the right to informational privacy . . .358 
V.  Is Cryptography an Arm Protected By the Second 
Amendment? 
The right to bear arms, like all of the other constitutional rights, is not 
absolute.359  It does not ens hrine “a right to keep and carry  any weapon 
whatsoever . . .”360 So if we accept that — in light of the ambiguous text but 
 
 353.  SINGH, supra note 9, at 296. 
 354.  Amar, supra note 118, at 896. 
 355.  Froomkin, supra note 12, at 732 (quoting S. REP. NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 
5 (1976)). 
 356.  See id. at 810–46 (exploring the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment and ge neralized 
privacy right implications of escrowed encryption). 
 357.  Bernstein IV, 176 F.3d at 1145–46. 
 358.  Bernstein IV, 176 F.3d at 1146 (citations omitted). 
 359.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 360.  Id. at 626. 
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powerful purposive arguments — cryptography is an arm, we still must ask 
if it is an arm protected by  the Second Amendment.  While answering the  
first question is difficult, answering the second is not: if cry ptography is an 
“arm,” it is clearly one protected by the Second Amendment. 
A.  In Common Use 
Heller tells us that protected weapons are those “‘in common use at the 
time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”361  As we have seen, this is the 
glue that connects the operative clause to the prefatory clause: The weapons 
people kept at home “for lawful purposes like self-defense ” were the same 
ones that they grabbed when rushing to  defend their Free State in their role 
as Militia members.362  So, we must first ask if cryptography is such a 
weapon. 
“[W]hat line separates ‘common’ fro m ‘uncommon’ ownership is 
something the Court did not say.”363  H owever, the Court did give us a 
benchmark: handguns are co mmon.364  In fact, the Court claimed that 
handguns are the most popular weapons for self-defense in our countr y.365  
That is incorrect.  Cryptography is the most common weapon Americans use 
for self-defense. 
Estimates of gun ownership in America vary, but even according the 
higher estimates, fewer than half of Am erican adults own firearms of any 
sort.366  And only about half of those keep their firearms for protection. 367  
Meanwhile, fully half of all American adults bank online;368 all of them  
protect themselves with Cryptography.369  Thus, cryptography must qualify 
as “in common use.”  And that is before  we even consider any of the other 
uses of cry ptography.  A nyone who uses Apple’s popular iMessage o r 
FaceTime applications is using cryptography  to keep his or her 
communications private.370  Anyone who uses https to browse the web uses 
 
 361.  Id. at 624 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). The Court has since made clear that “at the 
time” refers to the present day.  Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027, 1027–28 (2016). 
 362.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 363.  Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409. 
 364.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Gallup, Guns, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited May 3, 2015). 
 367.  See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Why own a gun? Protection is now top reason, (Mar. 12, 
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun-protection-is-now-top-reason/. 
 368.  See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 51% of American Adults Bank Online, (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/. 
 369.  See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 17, at 47-48. 
 370.  See SOGHOIAN, supra note 265. 
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cryptography to keep their web viewing habits secret.371  About one third of 
web traffic is encrypted in some format.372  Anyone who takes cash out of an 
ATM or electronically  transfers funds relies on cryptography.373  As does 
anyone who uses a virtual private network (“VPN”) to remotely access an 
organization’s network.374  Indeed, cryptography  “is an ess ential basis for 
trust on the Internet” that facilitates commerce and communication online.375  
It is omnipresent in our day-to-day lives, and it is there for our protection.376 
We generally use cr yptography to protect us financially, from threats 
like identity theft.  One m ight argue that therein lies a distinction of 
constitutional import: handguns can be used to protect life and limb, while 
cryptography is only used to protect pr operty.  But t hat is irrelevant.  The 
Heller Court explicitly stated that the “right to self-defense” inc ludes the 
defense of property.377  This follows from the common law of self-defense, 
which treats the difference between defending life and defending property as 
one of degree rather than of kind.378  Furthermore, cryptography does in fact 
protect life and lim b, as “at the higher end of the harm s scale, privacy  
concerns morph into matters of personal security.”379  For example, Somali 
pirates have begun infiltrating the networks of shipping companies in order 
to determine which ships they should target.380  For the sailors on those ships 
information security is integral to physical security .  Another powerful 
example, domestic violence survivors u se cryptography to ensure physical 
security.381  Moreover, cyber-attacks can cause physical harm.  For example, 
hackers can disable a car’s breaks, or destroy centrifuges. 
 
 371.  See id. 
 372.  Sandvine, Global Internet Phenomena Spotlight: Encrypted Internet Traffic, 3, 
https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2015/encrypted-interne 
t-traffic.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
 373.  FROOMKIN, supra note 12, at 720. 
 374.  SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 254, at 453–54. 
 375.  CLARKE ET AL., supra note 171, at 216–17. 
 376.  See id.; SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 254, at 453–54. 
 377.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“[T] he inherent right of  self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’  
that is overwhel mingly chosen b y American so ciety for that lawf ul purpose.  Th e prohibition 
extends, moreover, to the home,  where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.” (emphasis added)). 
 378.  See, e.g., Self-Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “self-
defense” as “The use of force to pr otect oneself, one’s family,  or one’s property from a real or  
threatened attack.” (emphasis added); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06. 
 379.  WITTES & BLUM, supra note 210, at 138. 
 380.  Patrick Gray, Risky Business # 401—Deserialization attacks are kind of a big deal, (Mar. 
3, 2016), http://risky.biz/RB401. 
 381.  See LAWRENCE, supra note 75. 
CRYPTO - FINAL_TOMLASTLOOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  2:43 PM 
74 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
B.  Dangerous and Unusual 
A related inquiry that some courts undertake is whether the arm at issue 
is “dangerous and unusual, ” as such weapons have long been ban ned and 
thus fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment.382  In many ways this 
is an identical exercise to the previous question, as any weapon “in common 
use” is, by definition, not “unusual.”383  But the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
for example, leaned on the fact that knives are less dangerous than handguns 
in cementing its conclusio n that the Second Amendment protects them.384  
Cryptography is unusual here because, unlike most other arm s, it is not 
dangerous. 
“An object is ‘dangerous ’ when it is ‘li kely to cause serious bodi ly 
harm.’”385  Generally, the common law distinguished between weapons that 
were dangerous per se (e.g., “fir earms, daggers, stilettos, and brass 
knuckles”), and those that were not (e.g ., “pocket knives, razors, h ammers, 
wrenches, and cutting tools”) based on whether they were primarily designed 
as weapons or as tools. 386  Cryptography was designed as a weapon, whic h 
would normally make it dangerous per se.387  However, a dangerous weapon 
is “‘an instrumentality designed and constructed to produce death or great  
bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodil y assault or defense.’” 388  
Obviously, cryptography does not fit this definition.  It does not cause bodily 
injury; it does not kill.  Thus, cryptography is an “unusually safe” weapon, 
which only further supports the conclusion that cryptograph y is an ar m 
protected by the Second Amendment.389 
C.  Appropriate to a Militia 
Lastly, some courts have asked whether the weapon at issue is 
“appropriate to a militia”390 or has “some reasonable relationship to the  
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”391  If we focus on this 
 
 382.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (citing sources); see also DeCiccio, 105 A.3d at 193. 
 383.  See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409; United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 384.  DeCiccio, 105 A.3d at 193. 
 385.  United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 386.  Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 692. 
 387.   Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303 (1980)). 
 388.  See id. 
 389.  See VOLOKH, supra note 176, at 1482–83 (2009). 
 390.  See Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 694. 
 391.  Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 622–25; Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–
79).  It is not clear this is an appropriate inquiry, given that Heller apparently rejected the similar 
inquiry of whether the weapon at issue was one “usually employed in civilized warfare.”  Volokh, 
supra note 176, at 219. 
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question, it seems clear that cryptography should be a protected arm.  Those 
weapons “commonly used for military and police functions” inherently “bear 
a relation to the preservation and effectiveness of state militias.”392  As 
explained above, civilized warfare and the military were the primary uses of 
cryptography for m ost of its histor y.  Indeed, the NSA, the U.S.  
Government’s main cryptographic agency is part of the Departm ent of 
Defense and the Director of the NSA i s also Co mmander of U.S . Cyber 
Command.393  Furthermore, the types of cryptography we use for self-defense 
are no longer dramatically different from the types of cryptography used by 
militaries.394  Thus, even if the Second Amendment’s protections extend only to 
arms useful in warfare, those protections would still apply to cryptography. 
It seems clear that cryptography should be viewed as an arm protected 
by the Second Am endment.  Therefore, we next look at whether the  
regulations of cryptography being proposed would burden the Second 
Amendment right. 
VI.  Would Suggested Regulations Burden the  
Second Amendment Right? 
Of course, concluding that cryptography is an arm that is protected by 
the Second Amendment does not nec essarily foreclose its reg ulation.395  
Although there are no concrete regulati ons to evaluate, it is worth thinking 
about how future regulations would be evaluated, and thus the constitutional 
considerations policy makers should take into account. 
In the years since Heller and McDonald were decided, the Courts of 
Appeals have largely co alesced around a  two-step test for  determining 
whether laws run afoul of the Second Amendment.396  At the first step, courts 
 
 392.  Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 
 393.  CLARKE, ET AL., supra note 171, at 185–86. 
 394.  See id.; SOGHOIAN supra note 265. 
 395.  Few gun laws have been struck down post-Heller.  See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Dept., 775 F.3d 308, 334 (6th Cir. 2014) (vacated pending rehearing en banc) (“It may be true that 
no other appeals court has  sustained a  Second Amendment challenge to  a fed eral firearms 
regulation since Heller was decided.” (citing United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 396.  See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(noting that the S econd Circuit’s two-step approach “broadly comports with the prevai ling two-
step approach of other courts, inc luding the T hird, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits” and citing GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 
F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 
194 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 
at 1252; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 
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“consider whether the restriction b urdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment.”397  If the answer is no, the inquiry is over.398  If the answer is 
yes, courts proceed to step two, in which they “must determine and apply the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.”399 
A.  Step One 
We have already do ne much of the wo rk required by the first st ep: 
determining whether cryptography is a protected arm.400  However, there are 
some additional questions to ask.  M ost importantly, do the sorts of 
regulations that have been discussed actually burden the Second Amendment 
right?  The cryptography debate has generally not included calls for outright 
bans on cryptography.  Rather, as we have seen, it has centered on requiring 
companies to include “backdoors.”401 
The White House has studied two slightly different potential back-doors 
schemes.402  Under one, the government would retain keys to smartphone 
encryption.403  Under the other, the sm artphone operating system 
manufacturer (i.e., Apple or Google) and the government would each retain 
a part of a key, so that only together would they be capable of decrypting the 
contents of the phone.404  These systems and others that may be put forward, 
like Clipper, accomplish the same end: they “provide some form of access 
to plaintext outside of the norm al channel of encryption or decryption.”405  
Such systems may be called “key recovery ,” “key escrow,” “trusted third-
party,” “exceptional acces s,” “data re covery,”406 “split ke y” or “secre t 
sharing.”407  While they “work in a variety  of way . . . . [a]ll these systems 
 
628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 397.  See id. 
 398.  See id. 
 399.  See id. 
 400.  See id. at 254–55. 
 401.  TIMBERG, supra note 99; WATT, ET AL., supra note 101; COMEY, supra note 95; Reed, 
supra note 100. 
 402.  Kevin Schaul, Encryption techniques and the access they give, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 
2015, available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/encryption-techniques-and-the-
access-they-give/1665/ (last accessed Apr. 16, 2015). 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Id. 
 405.  Id. 
 406.  Hal Abelson, et al. “The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and Trusted Third-Party 
Encryption,” May 27, 1997, available at http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A1 
27127 (last accessed Apr. 16, 2015), at 5–6. 
 407.  SCHAUL, supra note 402. 
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share the essential elements that concern us” here,408 and so for the sake of 
ease, this paper will refer to all such systems as “backdoors.” 
A law requiring backdoors would fundamentally degrade the protection 
cryptography offers.  Regulations that make arms less useful im pinge the 
right.409  Therefore, requirements that cry ptography have backdoors would 
implicate the Second Amendment. 
1.  The (In)Security of Backdoors 
In order to think about regulations requiring backdoors, it is important 
to understand why they would burden a Second Amendment right.  On the 
issue of backdoors, Director Comey said: 
 
There is a misconception that building a lawful intercept solution 
into a system requires a so-called “back door,” o ne that foreign 
adversaries and hackers may try to exploit.  But that isn’t true.  We 
aren’t seeking a back-door approach.  We want to use the front 
door, with c larity and transparency, and with clear guidance 
provided by law.  We are completely comfortable with court orders 
and legal process — front doors that provide the e vidence and 
information we need to investigate crime and prevent terrorist 
attacks.410 
 
NSA Director Admiral Rodgers similarly said: “‘Backdoor’ is not the 
context I would use, because when I hear the phrase ‘backdoor’ I think: ‘Well 
this is kind of shady, why wouldn’t you want to go in the front door, be very 
public?’”411  Director Co mey and Admiral Rogers exhibited t he same 
misunderstanding as the Washington Post Editorial Board when it opined 
that: 
 
 408.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 5–6; see also Encryption Technology and Possible 
US Policy Responses: Hearing Before the Info. Tech. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov. Oversight 
& Reform, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania) [ hereinafter 
“Blaze Testimony”]. 
 409.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–635 (D.C. law mandating trigger locks is unconstitutional); 
cf. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 175 (“Early American provisions protecting the right to “arms” were also 
crafted partly in response to British measures that, while not taking away guns entirely, drastically 
impaired their utility — suggesting ‘arms’ should be read to protect all those items necessary to use 
the weapons effectively.”) (citing Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun 
Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 577 (2006)). 
 410.  COMEY, supra note 95. 
 411.  Quoted in Tom McCarthy, NSA Director Defends Plan to Maintain ‘Backdoors’ Into 
Technology Companies, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2015, available at http://www.theguar 
dian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-into-technology-companies (last 
accessed Apr. 22, 2015). 
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A police ‘back door’ for all smartphones is undesirable — a back 
door can and will be exploited by bad guys, too.  However, with 
all their wizardry, perhaps Apple and Google could invent a kind 
of secure golden key they would retain and use only when a court 
has approved a search warrant.412 
 
Director Comey and The Washington Post are right that backdoors are 
easily attacked.  The problem with their analysis is that there is no technical 
difference between a “back door ,” a “front do or,” or a door locke d with a 
“secure golden key.”413  “Backdoor access is a technical requirem ent, and 
limiting access to law enforcement is a policy requirement.  As an engineer, 
[one] cannot design a s ystem that works differently in the presence of a 
particular badge or a signed piece of paper.”414  Regardless of what we call  
the door, it comes with the risk of being kicked do wn, having i ts locks 
picked, or their keys stolen.  As Bruce Schneier put it, “You can’t build  a 
backdoor that only the good guys can walk through.”415 
This is not a theoretical point: “Backdoor access built for the good guys 
is routinely used by the bad guys.”416  For example, Google built a backdoor 
into some of its applications, including Gmail, in order to comply with lawful 
search warrants.417  “China’s hackers subverted the access sy stem Google 
put in place to comply with U.S. intercept orders.” 418  Because Google ha d 
created backdoors into Gmail, Chinese hackers were able to spy on Chinese 
 
 412.  Editorial Board, Compromise needed on smartphone encryption, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 
2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromise-needed-on-smartpho 
ne-encryption/2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html (last accessed 
Apr. 16, 2015). 
 413.  See Jeffrey Vagle and Matt Blaze, Security ‘Front Doors’ vs. ‘Back Doors’: A Distinction 
Without a Difference, JUST SECURITY, Oct. 17, 2014, available at http://just 
security.org/16503/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-distinction-difference/ (last acc essed Apr. 
16, 2015) (“[T]he difference between a ‘front door’ vs. a ‘back door’ approach to law enforcement 
intercept of encrypted communications is purely s emantic.”); see also Bruce Schneier, iPhone 
Encryption and the Return of the Crypto Wars, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, Oct. 6, 2014, available at 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/10/iphone_encrypti_1.html (last accessed Apr. 16, 
2015); Bruce S chneier, Crypto Wars II, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, Nov. 15, 2014, available at 
https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2014/1115.html (last accessed  Apr.16, 2015); 
Soghoian, supra note 265. 
 414.  Bruce Schneier, quoted in Price, supra note 190. 
 415.  Schneier, iPhone Encryption and the Return of the Crypto Wars, supra note 413. 
 416.  Bruce Schneier, U.S. enables Chinese hacking of Google, CNN, Jan. 23, 2010, available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/23/schneier.google.hacking/index.html (last accessed 
Apr. 23, 2015). 
 417.  Id. 
 418.  Id. 
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human rights activists.419  Similarly, in 2005, an unknown attacker exploited 
the lawful intercept capabilities that Vodafone and Ericsson built into their 
cellular infrastructure to eavesdrop on the cell phone calls of the Greek prime 
minister, defense minister, foreign affairs minister, and a host of oth er 
prominent Greek figures.420  And although not quite of the sam e genre, 
encryption that had been weakened to comply with old U.S. export laws was 
showing up in internet protocols until 2015, rendering about one third of all 
internet sites vulnerable, including the FBI’s own tip reporting site.421 
This is not a matter of idiosyncratic mistakes being made; backdoors 
are inherently insecure for several reasons.  First, backdoors provide another 
path to the information being kept secret.422  The attacker now gets two bites 
at the apple: rather than having to break or circumvent the encryption on the 
plaintext, an attacker can break or circumvent either the encryption on the 
plain text or the protections on the key to the plaintext.423 
Second, and relatedly , implementing a backdoor requires tru sting 
someone to hold and to pr otect the keys to the back door.424  Regardless of 
whether the key s are held by  the government or a co mpany,425 this 
“represents a universal vulnerability  in any  escrowed co mmunication 
system.”426  It opens up t he possibility of insider abuse (rogue employ ees 
could be paid handsomely for stolen keys) and creates a wonderful target for 
attackers who could render huge swat hs of encry ption useless with one 
successful attack.427  To make this problem worse, backdoors need to poin t 
 
 419.  See id; Google, A new approach to China, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG, Jan. 12 , 2010, 
available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html (last accessed  
Apr. 23, 2015). 
 420.  SCHNEIER, supra note 416; Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair: 
How some extremely smart hackers pulled off the most audacious cell-network break-in ever, IEE 
SPECTRUM, June 29, 2007, available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair 
(last accessed Apr. 23, 2015); Abelson, supra note 406, at 10 & 17. 
 421.  Matthew Green, A History of Backdoors, A FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
ENGINEERING, July 20, 20 15, available at http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/07/a-
history-of-backdoors.html (last accessed Nov. 18, 2015). 
 422.  ABELSON, et al., supra note 406, at 11. 
 423.  See id. 
 424.  Id., at 11–12; Matthew Green , How do we build encryption backdoors?, SOME 
THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING, Apr. 16, 2015, available at http://blog.crypto 
graphyengineering.com/2015/04/how-do-we-build-encryption-backdors.html (last accessed Apr . 
22, 2015). 
 425.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 13. 
 426.  GREEN, supra note 424. 
 427.  See, ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 11–12; Abelson, et al., Keys Under Doormats: 
mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications, July 6, 2015, 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97690 (last accessed Aug. 4, 2016), at 2; Green, supra 
note 424. 
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to the location of their keys, which serves as “a r oadmap showing law 
enforcement how to recover the plaintext, but it may also show unauthorized 
attackers where to focus their efforts.”428  While there are schemes designed to 
minimize this risk — for example, by splitting the backdoor key between 
different escrow agents — these s ystems invariably introduce their own new 
vulnerabilities, and increase the financial costs of the system.429  Additionally, 
many of those schemes would be incompatible with law e nforcement’s 
requirement of rapid acces s to data.430  Indeed, the difficulty of protecting 
escrowed keys is highlighted by the theft from RSA of their “seed keys,” from 
which the keys for their hardware tokens are generated.431 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, adding backdoors to encryption 
schemes makes them dramatically more complex, and in computer security, 
vulnerability increases as complexity increases.432  “Every additional line of 
code you add to a system creates the possibility of more bugs.”433  Computer 
scientists refer to the “attack surface”: The more complex the code, the larger 
the attack surface, and the less secure the system.434  “[S]ecure cryptographic 
systems are deceptively hard to design and build properly . . . . Very small 
changes frequently introduce fatal security flaws.”435  The changes required 
for implementing back d oors would not be “very small,” rather “[t]hese 
schemes require you to alter every protocol in your encryption system, at a 
pretty fundamental level.”436  And to make matters worse, the fun damental 
changes required, “by [their] very nature, [have] to touch the most sensitive 
parts of the s ystem because the wiretapping interface has to have  the raw 
users’ communications going through it, which means that when you have a 
bug in that interface, it could lead to a catastrophic l oss of security of the 
system.”437  Add these fundamental changes to cryptographic systems that are 
“already so complex that even normal issues stress them to the breaking point,” 
 
 428.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 12. 
 429.  Id. at 12. So called “threshold encryption,” which theoretically allo ws decryption to be 
done via several keys without bringing them together, may provide a solution to some of these 
problems, but it has never been implemented in real life.   Green, supra note 424; see also, H.L. 
Nguyen, RSA Threshold Cryptography, May 4, 2005, (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Bristol) available at https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/269/Thesis.pdf (last accessed Apr. 22, 2015). 
 430.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 427, at 2. 
 431.  Id. at 9. 
 432.  See id. at 16. 
 433.  SOGHOIAN, supra note 265. 
 434.  Id. 
 435.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 13. 
 436.  GREEN, supra note 424. 
 437.  SOGHOIAN, supra note 265. 
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and we have a recipe for disaster.438  Importantly, this is not a simple matter of 
competence, expertise, or trying harder.439  Co mplexity induced pro blems 
even plagued the Clipper Chip, designed by the NSA, which “may be the most 
advanced cryptographic enterprise in the world.”440 
Additionally, some of the best practices in cryptographic engineering 
for data in motion are simply incompatible with the requirements of building 
backdoors.441  The first of these is “forward security.”442  In many systems 
for transmitting data, the data is first encrypted with a symmetric key — that 
is, a key which is used b oth for encrypting and decrypting data — using  a 
different symmetric key for each communication.  That s ymmetric key is 
then itself encrypted with a public key.  Public keys are used to encrypt data 
so that it can onl y be decrypted with th e corresponding private ke y.  This 
system works well as long as the relevant private key is never compromised; 
once it is, however, the at tacker can decrypt all of the data sent using the 
corresponding public key in the past — the attacker simply uses the private 
key to decrypt the symmetric key, and uses that to d ecrypt the message.443  
To mitigate this risk, cr yptographers prefer systems that provide “forward 
security.”  In these systems, the permanent public and private keys are not 
used to encr ypt anything, but are only used to allow the co mmunicating 
parties to identify each other; once that occurs, disposable keys for one time 
use are created.444  Because a new key is used for each transaction, a stole n 
key only endangers a sing le communication rather than all previous and 
future communications.445  Because the point of a long-term escrow key for 
law enforcement is to introduce the backwards looking risk that forward security 
is designed to eliminate, “all known methods of achieving third-party escrow 
are incompatible with forward security.”446 
Another best practice that key escrow compromises is “authenticated 
encryption.”447  This technique provi des confidentiality while at the sam e 
 
 438.  Matthew Green, Attack of the week: FREAK or (‘factoring the NSA for fun and profit’), 
A FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING, Mar. 3, 2 015, available at http://blog 
.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/03/attack-of-week-freak-or-factoring-nsa.html (last accessed 
Apr. 23, 2015); see also Green, supra note 424, (“[o]ur encryption software is already so complex 
that it’s literally at the breaking point.”). 
 439.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 13. 
 440.  Id. 
 441.  See ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 427, at 2. 
 442.  Id. 
 443.  Id. at 12. 
 444.  Id. 
 445.  Id. 
 446.  Id. 
 447.  Id. at 13. 
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time confirming whom  one is co mmunicating with.448  In these sy stems, 
escrowing keys would give the party with the escrowed key  the power, not 
only to read encrypted communications, but “to forge traffic to the recipient” 
in such a way that it appears to be coming from the original sender.449 
“[B]uilding the secure in frastructure of the breathtaking scale and 
complexity that would be required for such a [backdoor] scheme is beyond 
the experience and current competency of the field . . . .”450  While Director 
Comey and Admiral Rogers apparently disagree with this conclusion, the y 
have not produced any technical explanation for their disagreement.451  And 
most, if not all, technical experts agree that that all cryptographic sy stems 
with back doors “are inherently  less secure” than they  would be without 
backdoors.  Therefore, mandating backdoors woul d surely burden the 
individual’s Second Amendment rights. 
2.  Presumptively Valid Regulations 
In analyzing the constitutionality of an arm s regulation, some courts 
first ask whether the regulations at issue are among those that the Heller court 
would consider “presumptively lawful.”452  Heller stated: 
 
[N]othing in our opini on should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and governm ent buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.453 
 
There are no longstanding regulations of domestic cryptography, although 
the few remaining export control restrictions would perhaps count. 
Some narrow cry ptography regulations might be cognizable as 
presumptively valid, in keeping with the spirit of the safe harbor.  For  
example, laws prohibiting felons from carrying firearms might have their 
equivalents in laws prohibiting co nvicted child pornographers fro m 
encrypting their data.  However, in order to be analogous to the regulations 
listed by the court, these hypothetically valid regulations would need to be 
limited and tailored to situations of pa rticular concern.  Forcing companies 
 
 448.  Id. 
 449.  Id. 
 450.  ABELSON, ET AL., supra note 406, at 19. 
 451.  See, e.g., REED, supra note 100, (quoting Adm. Rogers saying “My position is — hey 
look, I think that we’re lying that this isn’t technically feasible.”). 
 452.  See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. 
 453.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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to build backdoors into cryptography, or any other attempt to regulate the 
mass consumption of cryptography, is of vastly greater scope than the court 
apparently imagined when stating that it did not want to cast doubt on certain 
regulations. 
3.  Do regulations on suppliers infringe on the Second Amendment? 
The last of Heller’s enumerated exceptions brings us to another point.  
Most of the public discussion about cryptography controls has focused on 
regulating companies — such as Apple and Google  — that manufacture 
consumer electronics, rather than on  regulating t he individual user of 
cryptography.  Whether, and to what e xtent, those who trade in arms have 
Second Amendment rights (and whether a nd to what extent regulations on 
them burden the Second Amendment rights of their customers) is still being 
hashed out in the lower courts. 454  While a full analysis of these issues is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it appears the weight of precedent supports the 
conclusion that manufacturers, retailers, and others either have their own 
Second Amendment rights or can sue to enforce the Second Amendment rights 
of their customers.455  If manufacturers, retailers, and other arms related 
businesses have Second Amendment rights (or can enforce those of their 
customers), the fact that cry ptography regulations act on Apple and Google 
rather than individuals would be constitutionally irrelevant. 
Eugene Volokh has suggested that the proper way to evaluate whether 
restrictions on manufacturers and retailers violate the Second Amendment might 
be to ask whether those restrictions “impose a substantial burden on the exercise 
of the protected right.”456  That is  to say that restrictions that make protected 
weapons “substantially costlier or harder to get” would be unconstitutional.457  
This approach would similarly make it irrelevant whether the sort of regulations 
being considered act on retailers rather than consumers. 
 
 454.  See generally David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms 
Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. REV. 230 (Apr. 11, 2014). 
 455.  See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n. 8; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 711 
(7th Cir. 2011); Kole v. Village of Norridge, 941 F. Supp. 2d 933, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Ill. Ass’n 
of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 2014); but see 
United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Conrad, 923 F. 
Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
 456.  VOLOKH, supra note 176, at 1545. 
 457.  Id. 
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B.  Step Two 
At the second step of the analysis, most courts identify an appropriate 
level of scru tiny and apply  it t o the regulation.458  Drawing on First  
Amendment doctrine, many of the Circ uits use a sliding scale of judicial  
scrutiny depending on how severe a b urden the re gulation places on the 
Second Amendment right and “how close the law comes to the co re of the 
Second Amendment right.”459  Of the three traditional l evels of scrutiny — 
rational basis, intermediate, and strict — Heller did rule out rational basis.460  
This leaves a  choice betw een intermediate and stric t scrutiny (as well a s 
points on the opaque cont inuum between them) on the table for courts to 
choose from.461  And that choice is a difficult and contentious one.462 
In most cases, the Circuits have ended up appl ying some form of 
intermediate scrutiny.463  Yet many courts have indicated that strict scrutiny 
would be appropriate for those cases which burden the “core” of the right: 
the “right of  law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense o f 
hearth and home.”464  There are also those judges who believe strict scrutiny 
should always apply.465 
However, some restrictions — those that “destroy” rather than merely 
burden that right — are p er se invalidated, without t he application of an y 
level of scrutiny, as was the D.C. law in Heller.466  An outright ban on all 
cryptography would likely fall into that category.  In Heller, the Court held 
that the D.C. law, which banned handgun possessi on in the home was 
 
 458.  See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 904 F.3d at 55–59. 
 459.  Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; see e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 258–60; 
Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; NRA v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 707; 
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168 n.15. 
 460.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n. 27. 
 461.  See Tyler, 775 F.3d at 323 (“intermediate and strict scrutiny are not binary poles in the 
area of heightened scrutiny. These familiar tests can take on many names and versions”). 
 462.  See id. (“The appropriate level of scrutiny that courts should apply in Second Amendment 
cases . . . remains a difficult, highly contested question.”). 
 463.  See Tyler, 775 F.3d at 324–26 (collecting cases). 
 464.  See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 93–94); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (“we 
find the application of strict scrutiny important to protect the core right of the self-defense of a law-
abiding citizen in his home”); see also Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168 n.15. 
 465.  See Tyler, 775 F.3d at 328 (“[W]e prefer strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny.  I n 
choosing strict s crutiny, we join a significant, increasingly emergent though, as yet, minority 
view . . . .” (citing Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1145–46, 1149–52 (Bea, J., concurring); NRA v. ATF, 714 
F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.2013) (Jones, J., dissental, joined by Jolly, Smith, Clement, Owen, & Elrod, 
JJ.); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1284 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 466.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628; Peruta, 742 F.3d 1170. 
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unconstitutional.467  The Court wrote that, “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny . . . banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation 
to keep and  use for protection of o ne’s home and family would fail  
constitutional muster.”468  By that logic, banning cryptography — which is 
more commonly used for self-defense than handguns — would surely violate 
the Second Amendment, under any standard of scrutiny. 
But backdoor mandates could fall into that category as well.  One way 
to think about a regulation mandating backdoors is as a ban on en cryption 
products without backdoors.  Thought of, in this way, such regulations might 
be akin to the handgun ban struck down in Heller.  After all, the law in Heller 
did not ban all guns.  The Court wrote: 
 
It is no answer to sa y, as petitioners do, that it  is permissible to 
ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other 
firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.  It is enough to  note, as we 
have observed, that the A merican people have con sidered the 
handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.  There are 
many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for hom e 
defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible 
in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away 
by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-body 
strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar 
with one hand while the other hand dials the police.  Whatever the 
reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by 
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a com plete 
prohibition of their use is invalid.469 
 
Similar logic could apply here, as unbackdoored cryptography is the industry 
standard and there are good reasons to prefer it.470 
But even if per se  invalidation is not appropriate, strict scrutiny of a 
general back-door requirement may well be.  Courts have indicated that strict 
scrutiny is applicable in the Second Amendment context to re gulations, 
 
 467.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 468.  Id. at 628–29. 
 469.  Id. at 629. 
 470.  Public consciousness has obviously not coalesced around unbackdoored encryption in the 
same way it has around the handgun as “the quinte ssential self-defense weapon.”  But it seems  
unlikely that the popular imagination of self-defense was intended to be a deciding factor in the 
Court’s analysis allowing per se invalidation.  Constitutional interpretation does not generally hinge 
on Clint Eastwood’s prop choices.  And, in any event, unbackdoored encryption is likely at least as 
popular as handguns for self-defense.  See Kolbe, 813 F.3d  at 181 ( “A semi-automatic rifle may 
not be ‘the quintessential self-defense weapon,’ as Heller described the handgun; nonetheless, as 
we explained previously, AR–15s and the like are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
self-defense and other lawful purposes and are protected under the Second Amendment.”) (citation 
omitted)). 
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which put a severe burden on the core of the right.471  Serious degradation of 
the usefulness of encryption would likely fit this standard. 
To begin with, the burden would be severe.  Let’s c ontinue to think 
about a law mandating backdoors as law that outlaws a narrower class o f 
arms: encryption without back doors.  Such a re gulation would be “a 
complete prohibition” on a class of arms, rather than something that “merely 
regulate[s] the manner in which persons may exercise their  Second 
Amendment rights.”472  Courts have indicated that a ban on an entire class of 
arms is a severe Second Amendment burden.473 
Backdoors also simply make encryption far less effective.474  Moreover, 
such regulations would not leave adequate alternative means for self-defense 
available.475  This is different from the firearm context: While a rational citizen 
might have good reasons to choose a handgun over a semiautomatic weapon for 
self-defense in the home,476 or vise-versa,477 there are few reasons to prefer 
encryption without a backdoor.478  And what reasons there are — for example, 
enabling you to retrieve information if you lose a password — are unrelated to 
the effectiveness of the weapon for self-defense. 
But not all laws putting a severe burden on the Second Amendment 
right trigger strict scrutiny.  They only do so if they impinge upon the “core” 
of that right: the right to s elf-defense in the home.479  Banning encrypt ion 
without backdoors would impinge on that core, because it would im plicate 
the privacy and security that we as sociate with our hom es.480  Therefore, 
strict scrutiny should probably apply. 
However, that still leaves the issue of  applying the chosen standard.  
Although the standards of scrutiny are imprecise,481 both strict and 
intermediate scrutiny requires weighing the importance of the gov ernment 
interest being protected b y a regulation  and the degr ee of fit between the 
regulation and that interest.  Strict scrut iny, famously, is “‘strict’ in theor y 
but usually ‘fatal’ in fact.”482  It places the burden on the government to show 
 
 471.  See, e.g., Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181; N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 805 F.3d at 259. 
 472.  N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 805 F.3d at 259; see also Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 179–84. 
 473.  Id.  
 474.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–635; cf. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 175. 
 475.  See N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 805 F.3d at 259; Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 180–81. 
 476.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 477.  See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 411. 
 478.  See supra section VI.A.1. 
 479.  See N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 805 F.3d at 259. 
 480.  See supra section IV.B.5. 
 481.  See, e.g., Tyler, 775 F.3d at 322–23. 
 482.  Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n. 6 (1984). 
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that a law is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”483  By 
contrast, intermediate scrutiny “require[s] the asserted governmental end to 
be more than just legitimate, either ‘significant,’ ‘substanti al,’ or 
‘important’” and “require[s] the fit between the challenged regul ation and 
the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect.”484 
In terms of the im portance of the govern ment interest at stake, the 
choice between standards is irreleva nt: public safety and crime prevention 
— presumably the goal of any regulation on cryptography — is the ultimate 
government interest.485  But the choice between inter mediate and strict 
scrutiny is likely to impact the analysis of the fit between the law and the 
government interest. 
However, under either standard a general backdoor mandate may be 
troublesome, for it would  affect the v ast majority of Americans in their 
everyday lives in order to solve a problem that only occurs relatively rarely.  
Perhaps “this is to burn the house to roast the pig,”486 rather than a reasonably 
or narrowly tailored solution. 
Under intermediate scru tiny, many courts have up held firearms 
regulations in the face of Second Amendment challenges because they gave 
substantial deference to the legislature’s judgment about the necessity of the 
law at issue.487  Whether the deference those Courts give to the legislature is 
appropriate is beyond the scope of this article.488  The important point is that 
if cryptography regulations wer e enacted, that defe rence alone may, in 
practice, be enough to uphold them. 
However, Courts often draw on the more developed First Amendment 
doctrine when dealing with Second Amendment cases.489  Traditionally in the 
First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny requires that a regulation not 
burden substantially more of the right than necessary to achieve the government 
interest.490  Meeting that standard may be difficult for a regulation requiring 
 
 483.  FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
 484.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (collecting cases). 
 485.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (public safety is “a primary concer n 
of every government” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987))); see also 
Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 32, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The Government’s interest in preventing crime 
is not merely substantial and important; it is ‘compelling.’”). 
 486.  Butler v. State of Mich., 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
 487.  See Drake, 724 F.3d at 436–37; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97. 
 488.  See Peruta, 742 F.3d 1177. 
 489.  See, e.g., Tyler, 775 F.3d at 327 n.14. 
 490.  See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
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backdoors, which would impact most Americans, the vast majority of whom are 
law abiding citizens practicing legitimate self-defense.491 
Another factor that should be considered in determining whether such 
regulation is appropriately tailored are how m any alternative routes of 
surveillance and information gathering the gover nment has, and how 
effective those routes are,492 as well as how few instances there have been of 
cryptography foiling law enforcement.493  Furthermore, even though public 
safety and cri me prevention is a compelling state interest, cry ptography 
regulations have a more attenuated relationship to that interest than firearms 
regulations. 
II.  Conclusion 
The Second Am endment should n ot be confined to  relevance in  the 
analog world any more than the First or Fourth Amendments.  In the digital 
world, we live in the shad ow of online threats to our property , our safety, 
and our liberty.  In this wo rld, the primary tool with which we can defend 
ourselves is cryptography.  Thus, because the Second Amendment has as its 
ultimate aim enabling us to defend ourselves — be it against criminals or 
tyrants — that Amendment should protect cryptography. 
 
 
 
 
 491.  Cf. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1176–78. 
 492.  See e.g., Urs Grasser, et al., Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate, 
Feb. 1, 2016, available at https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/ (last accessed Feb. 
4, 2016). 
 493.  See e.g., Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on Smartphone Encryption 
and Public Safety, Nov. 2015, available at http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/11.18.15%20 
Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%20and%20Public%20Safety.pdf (last accessed  
Feb. 4, 2016) (noting 111 instances between Sept. 2014 and Oct. 2015 in which search warrants 
could not be executed because of encryption b ut not claiming th at in any  case it prevented  
prosecution). 
